https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1994_Black_Hawk_shootdown_incident
The 1994 Black Hawk shootdown incident, sometimes referred to as the Black Hawk Incident, was a friendly fire incident over northern Iraq that occurred on 14 April 1994 during Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). The pilots of two United States Air Force (USAF) F-15 fighter aircraft, operating under the control of a USAF airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, misidentified two United States Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as Iraqi Mil Mi-24 "Hind" helicopters. The F-15 pilots fired on and destroyed both helicopters, killing all 26 military and civilians aboard, including personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the Kurdish community.
Fogleman's investigation led to several of the officers involved in the incident receiving further administrative discipline. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) subsequently refused U.S. Senate subpoenas for four USAF officers to be interviewed for the Senate investigation, which was never publicly released. The U.S. House investigation, conducted in part by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), found that the military investigative and judicial systems had operated mostly as designed, but also noted that the DoD had refused access to key witnesses.
GAO investigation
In September 1995 the House National Security Subcommittee on Military Personnel, chaired by Bob Dornan, requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct its own investigation into the shootdown incident. Specifically, the GAO was asked to determine if the USAF accident investigation board had met its objectives, if the subsequent military justice investigations had followed established guidelines, and if the DoD and/or USAF had improperly or unlawfully influenced these investigations.[64]
The GAO released its investigation report on 12 November 1997. The investigation determined that the USAF accident investigation was properly convened and met its assigned objectives. The GAO report, however, found that the USAF investigation had failed to note that Wickson and May neglected to report their contact with unidentified aircraft to the Duke (Martin) aboard the AWACS as required by the ROE. Furthermore, the USAF investigation report incorrectly stated that Martin had no authority to terminate the engagement when, in fact, he did. The GAO report added that the failure of Wickson and May to report their contact to Martin was indicative of a well-known, general lack of discipline among F-15 aircrews involved in OPC and this was not discussed in the USAF report.[65]
The GAO investigation also uncovered evidence that a rivalry between F-15 and F-16 pilots may have contributed to Wickson's and May's "urgency to engage hostile aircraft" but was not discussed in the USAF investigation.[66] During the GAO's investigation, USAF OPC officers confirmed that the rivalry between the F-15 and F-16 communities was particularly pronounced and intense partly due to the fact that F-16 aircraft had scored all the air-to-air combat kills in Iraq and Bosnia since the end of the Gulf War. Pilkington stated to the GAO that "the shootdown pilots' haste was due in part to the planned entry of two F-16s into the TAOR 10 to 15 minutes after the F-15s and that if the F-15 pilots had involved the chain of command, the pace would have slowed down, ruining the pilots' chances for a shootdown."
The GAO investigation also uncovered evidence that a rivalry between F-15 and F-16 pilots may have contributed to Wickson's and May's "urgency to engage hostile aircraft" but was not discussed in the USAF investigation.[66] During the GAO's investigation, USAF OPC officers confirmed that the rivalry between the F-15 and F-16 communities was particularly pronounced and intense partly due to the fact that F-16 aircraft had scored all the air-to-air combat kills in Iraq and Bosnia since the end of the Gulf War. Pilkington stated to the GAO that "the shootdown pilots' haste was due in part to the planned entry of two F-16s into the TAOR 10 to 15 minutes after the F-15s and that if the F-15 pilots had involved the chain of command, the pace would have slowed down, ruining the pilots' chances for a shootdown." The GAO concluded that if the evidence of a lack of mission discipline by Wickson and May had been included in the USAF report, such information "could have been useful in subsequent administrative and disciplinary actions."[67]
Another aspect the GAO investigation revealed was that the training F-15 pilots received for identifying helicopters was not adequate. Visual ID training was accomplished by reviewing slides on a 35mm projector. Helicopters made up only about 5% of the training slides and nearly all the pictures depicted helicopters from the ground looking up because the pictures were provided by the U.S. Army. Investigators also learned from interviewing other F-15 pilots that helicopter recognition was not regarded as an important skill within the F-15 pilot community because helicopters are not considered a threat to F-15s in air-to-air combat.[68]
The GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence by USAF leaders on the investigation or subsequent administrative and military justice actions. The GAO noted, however, that it was unable to obtain complete confirmation of this finding because the DoD denied the GAO request to interview key USAF officials including Santarelli, Dallager, Starr, and Mangin.[69]
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https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-OSI-98-4/pdf/GAOREPORTS-OSI-98-4.pdf
Aircraft accident investigation board
President's opinion
3. statement of opinion
Under 10 U.S.C. 2254 (D) any opinion of accident investigation as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to the accident set forth in the accident investigation report, may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from an aircraft accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability by the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statements
Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) has been a successful coalition effort in response to human rights abuses against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. The operation has effectively deterred Iraq from disrupting peace and order in the UN-established security zone.
THe 14 April 1994 shoot-down of two (2) US Black hawk helicopters by two (2) US F-15c aircraft in northern Iraq was caused by a chain of events which began with the breakdown of clear guidance from the Combined Task force (CTF) to its component organizations. This resulted in the lack of a clear understanding among the components of their respective responsibilities. Consequently, CTF (combined task force) component organizations did not fully integrate Military Coordination Center helicopter activities wit other OPC air operations in the Tactical Area of Responsibility [TAOR]. ([ no communication, mis communication, communication breakdown, no talking, they fight with and against each other, broken family (community), broken family (community) get people killed, unproductive rivalry and competition (...) leads to death ])
Additionally, OPC personnel did not receive consistent, comprehensive training to ensure they had a thorough understanding of the USEUCOM-directed ROE (rule of engagement). As a result, some aircrews' understanding of how the approved ROE should be applied, became over-simplified.
MCC (military coordination center) were given a high degree of independence in helicopter operations, without an adequate consideration for the threat of engagement from other OPC aircraft. Neither the CFC (combined task force) staff nor the Combined Forces air component staff requested or received timely, detailed flight information on planned MCC helicopter activities in the TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility]. Consequently, the OPC daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) was published with little detailed information regarding US helicopter flight activities over nothern Iraq. Specific information on routes of flights and times of MCC helicopter activity in the TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility] was normally available to the other OPC participants only when AWACS received it from the helicopter crews by radio and relayed the information on.
look up AWACS
airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
The AWACS mission crew commander on 14 April 1994, who had flown only one sortie in the previous three (3) months, was not currently qualified in accordance with air force regulations. The AWACS weapons controllers, under his supervision, did not have a clear understanding of their individual responsibilities to provide support to MCC (military coordination center) helicopters. They shared a common view, along with the CFAC (combined forces air component staff) airborned command element officer, that MCC helicopter activities were not an integral part of OPC [Operation Provide Comfort] air operations. There was general misunderstanding throughout OPC [Operation Provide Comfort] organizations regarding the extent to which the provisions of the Airspace Control Order (ACO) applied to MCC helicopter activities. AWACS personnel did not routinely monitor the Black hawk helicopter flights or pass information on those flights to other OPC aircraft. The result was that there was no effective coordination of OPC fixed-wing and helicopter operations within the TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility].
On 14 April 1994, AWACS controllers were aware that the Black hawk helicopters had departed Zakhu, and were proceeding east into the TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility]. The F-15 pilots were not aware of the Black hawk helicopters already in the area. The fighters twice informed AWACS that they had unknown rader contacts in the TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility]. The AWACS mission crew commander, senior weapons director, enroute controller and TAOR controller had access to electronic information regarding the presence of friendly aircraft in the vicinity of the F-15s' reported radar contacts. However, there is no evidence that they were aware of, recognized, or responded to this information. They did not advise teh F-15 pilots of the presence of friendly aircraft. The helicopters were unable to hear the radio transmission between the F-15 flight and AWACS because they were ona different radio frequency.
skip two (2) paragraphs on interrogating the ATO-designated IFF mode I and mode IV aircraft codes. See page 55/60 (pdf), Appendix I : aircraft accident investigation board, president's opinion, Review of the US air force investigation of Black hawk fratricide incident, Operation provide comfort, November 1997, GAO (us general accounting office), office of special investigation, GAO/OSI-98-4 review of USAF investigation of fratricide incident.
When the F-15 pilots were unable to get positive/consistent IFF responses they performed an intercept in oder to visually identify the "unknown" aircraft. They each made a single identification pass on the Black hawks. However, the identification passes were accomplished at speeds, altitudes and distances where it was unlikely that the pilots would have been able to detect the Black hawks' markings. Neither F-15 pilot had received recent, adequate visual recognition training. The pilots did not recognize the differences between the US black hawk helicopters with wing-mounted fuel tanks and Hind helicopters with wing-mounted weapons. The F-15 flight lead misidentified the US black hawk as Iraqi Hind helicopters. Following his identification pass, he asked his wingman to confirm the identification. The wingman, who was a senior squadron supervisor and instructor pilot, saw two helicopters, but did not positively identify them as Hinds. The wingman did not notify the flight lead that he had been unable to make a positive identification, and allowed the engagement to continue. The flight lead, acting within the specified ROE [rule of engagement], fired a single missile and shot down the trail Black hawk helicopter. At flight lead's direction, the F-15 wingman also fired a single missile and shot down the lead Black hawk helicopter.
[[signature]]
James G. Andrus
Maj Gen, USAF
Board President
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-OSI-98-4/pdf/GAOREPORTS-OSI-98-4.pdf
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from everything you've read, were the followings questions satisfy?
what happened?
how did it happened?
why did it happened?
who was involved?
is this a complete story?
is this story interesting?
should more people know about this story?
can this be made into a good screenplay?
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