Saturday, March 8, 2025

experience - eexp

 

Experience (empirical, ἐμπειρία, empeiría, senses): 
            Empirical evidence is the information received by means of the senses, particularly by observation and documentation of patterns and behavior through experimentation.[1] The term comes from the Greek word for experience, ἐμπειρία (empeiría).

source:   
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical_evidence
   ____________________________________

Gary Gach, The complete idiot's guide to Buddhism, 3rd edition, 2009 

p.15
non authoritarian (non coercive), 
empirical (see for yourself), 
real-time (present-moment), 
pragmatic (practical), 

Gary Gach, The complete idiot's guide to Buddhism, 3rd edition, 2009 
   ____________________________________

   • As a result, technology has served as an enormous repository of empirical knowledge to be scrutinized and evaluated by the scientist., p.144, Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the black box: technology and economics, 1982.  


Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the black box: technology and economics, 1982

pp.142-143
p.142
  This paper, then, is a kind of preliminary reconnaissance, the beginning of an attempt to develop a conceptual framework that will improve our understanding of the connections between science and economic performance.  

p.142
In view of the obvious and compelling importance of this subject, I offer only a token apology for the fact that this paper is, at best, only the first small step on a long intellectual journey.  I will argue that technology influences scientific activity in numerous and pervasive ways.  I will attempt to identify some of the most important categories of influence and to sharpen our understanding of the causal mechanisms at work.

p.142
  Of course, the influence of certain technological concerns on the growth of scientific knowledge has long been recognized.  Torricelli's demonstration of the weight of air in the atmosphere, a scientific breakthrough of fundamental importance, was an outgrowth of this attempt to design an improved pump.2  Sadi Carnot's remarkable accomplishment in creating the science of thermodynamics was an outgrowth of the attempt, a half century or so after Watt's great innovation, to understand what determined the efficiency of steam engines.3  Joule's discovery of the law of the conservation of energy grew out of an interest in alternative sources of power generation at his father's brewery.4  

pp.142-143
Pasteur's development of the science of bacteriology emerged from his attempt to deal with problems of fermentation and putrefaction in the French wine industry.  In all these cases, scientific knowledge of a wide generality grew out of a particular problem in a narrow context.  

p.143
elemental point:  Technology is itself a body of knowledge about certain classes of events and activities.  
It is a knowledge of techniques, methods, and designs that work, and that work in a certain ways and with certain consequences, even when one cannot explain exactly why. 

p.143
gives only a very limited sense of the nature and extent of the interplay between science and technology.  Indeed, that sense is totally suppressed in the prevailing formulation of our time, 

p.143
it is common to look at causality as running exclusively from science to technology, and in which it is common to think of technology as if it were reducible to the application of prior scientific knowledge. 

p.143
Thus, it seems to be quite worthwhile to examine the science ─ technology interaction with greater care. 

p.144
 As a result, technology has served as an enormous repository of empirical knowledge to be scrutinized and evaluated by the scientist. 

  (Inside the black box./ Nathan Rosenberg, 1. technological innovations., 2. technology─social aspects., HC79.T4R673   1982, 338'.06, first published 1982, )
   ____________________________________

              "By three methods we may learn wisdom: 
                 First, by reflection, which is noblest; 
                 Second, by imitation, which is easiest; and 
                 third by experience, which is the bitterest." 
               <look up this quote> 
   ____________________________________

             Polybius, 1979, p.80
             “ I have recorded those events in the hope that the readers 
              of this history may profit from them, for there are two ways 
              by which all men may reform themselves, either by learning 
              from their own errors or from those of others, the former 
              makes a more striking demonstration, the latter a less painful
              one. For this reason we should never, if we can avoid it, 
              choose the first, since it involves great dangers as well as 
              great pain, but always the seconds, since it reveals 
              the best course without causing us harm.  
              From this I conclude that the best education for 
              the situation of actual life consists of the experience 
              we acquire from the study of serious history.  
              For it is history alone which without causing us harm 
              enables us to judge what is best course in any situation or
              circumstance. ”
              http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polybius
   ____________________________________

Robert Greene, The 48 laws of power (a Joost Elffers book), 1998    [ ]

p.58
Nikola Tesla was one of those. He believed science had nothing to do with politics, and claimed not to care for fame and riches. As he grew older, though, this ruined his scientific work. Not associated with any particular discovery, he could attract no investors to his many ideas. While he pondered great inventions for the future, other stole the patents he had already developed and got the glory for themselves. 
   He wanted to do everything on his own, but merely exhausted and impoverished himself in the process. 
   Edison was Tesla's polar opposite. He wasn't actually much of a scientific thinker or inventor; he once said that had no need to be a mathematician because he could always hire one. That was Edison's main method. He was really a businessman and publicist, spotting the trends and the opportunities that were out there, then hiring the best in the field to do the work for him. If he had to he would steal from his competitors. 

p.58
Everybody steals in commerce and industry. I've stolen a lot myself. But I know how to steal. 

Thomas Edison, 1847-1931 

p.58
Time is precious and life is short. If you try to do it all on your own, you run yourself ragged, waste energy, and burn yourself out. 

p.5
To be sure, if the hunter relies on the security of the carriage, utilizes the legs of the six horses, and makes Wang Liang hold their reins, then he will not tire himself and will find it easy to overtake swift animals. Now supposing he discarded the advantage of the carriage, gave up the useful legs of the horses and the skill of Wang Liang, and alighted to run after the animals, then even though his legs were as quick as Lou Chi's, he would not be in time to overtake the animals. In fact, if good horses and strong carriages are taken into use, then mere bondmen and bondwomen will be good enough to catch the animals. 

Han-Fei-Tzu, Chinese philosopher, 3rd century B.C. 

p.59
He did not understand that half of the game was keeping it quiet, and carefully watching those around him. 

pp.59-60
   There is another application of this law that does not require parasitic use of your contemporaries' labor: Use the past, as vast storehouse of knowledge and wisdom. Isaac Newton called this “standing on the shoulders of giants.” He meant that in making his discoveries he had built on the achievements of others. A great part of his aura of genius, he knew, was attributable to his shrewd ability to make the most of the insights of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance scientists. Shakespeare borrowed plots, characterizations, and even dialogue from Plutarch, among other writers, for he knew that nobody surpassed Plutarch in the writing of subtle psychology and witty quotes. 

p.60
   Writers who have delved into human nature, ancient master of strategy, historians of human stupidity and folly, kings and queens who have learned the hard way how to handle the burdens of power--their knowledge is gathering dust, waiting for you to come and stand on their shoulders. 

p.60
You can slog through life, making endless mistakes, wasting time and energy trying to do things from your own experience. Or you can use the armies of the past. As Bismarck once said, “Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others' experience.”  

   (The 48 laws of power, Robert Greene (a Joost Elffers book), 1998, )
   ____________________________________

Robert S. McNamara, In retrospect : the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, [1995] 

p.xvii
The ancient Greek dramatist Aeschylus wrote, “The reward of suffering is experience.”

p.29
We must be clear-sighted in beginnings, for, as in their budding we discern not the danger, so in their full growth we perceive not the remedy 
       ── Montaigne, Essays
  Michael Eyquem de Montaigne 

   ( In retrospect : the tragedy and lesson of Vietnam / Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark.──1st ed., 1. vietnam conflict, 1961─1975 ── united states., DS558.M44  1995, 959.704'3373──dc20, ) 
   ____________________________________

Colin Powell with Tony Koltz., It worked for me : in life and leadership, 2012

p.12
As the saying goes, “Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from bad judgment.”

p.169
Learning and improvement are the sole focus, not the unit's success or failure 

  (It worked for me : in life and leadership / Colin Powell with Tony Koltz. ── 1st ed., 1. Powell, Colin L., 2. African American generals ── biography., 3. united states ── politics and government ── 1993-2001 ── quotations, maxims, etc., 4. leadership ── united states., E840.5.P68A3  2012, 973.931092──dc23,  2012, )
   ____________________________________

Ed Catmull                              [  ]

recorded January 31, 2007
uploaded on Jul 28, 2009
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k2h2lvhzMDc
13:17
           "... because they love alot of things, they were willing to put up with stuff they didn't like.  And I think this is one of the fundamental problems with company: Success hides problems.  It happens to alot of us in our personal lives with our health.  When we are healthy, we doing alot things that are bad for us, but our health let us get away with doing stuff that are bad for us, and years later the logic doesn't hold up, but we do that.  It happens with a lot of companies.  It happens with states, local, and national governments.  When you are healthy and you have got the resources, you don't need to address the problems.  ... they were actually very healthy and very strong.  The problems were there and they did not have to look at them at that time.  They let the success, and they were successful at that time, they let the success get in the way of diving deep and finding the problems.";--Ed Catmull-Pixar, keep your crises small, youtube.com
14:15

22:58
that's why you need a team that works well together
we had a developement department at the time 
like the studio
its a group of people looking for ideas to make into movies
we went throught this, we realizes, we're thinking about it in the wrong way
the goal of development is not to find good ideas, 
it's to put together teams of people that function well together
and that changed alter the way we thought about making movie 
this development department is a support group 
it's a failure only if you don't learn from it 
it set the way we think about things   
copying is a form of learning 

37:18
rather than saying, first one is not successful, what can we do to make it successful (it's a failure only if you don't learn from it)

post mortem 
  there is a note taker
  in preparing for it
  there is a hand off
  just having the discussion surfaces alot of things 
   ____________________________________

    “Its working cannot be judged by arguments, 
     only by application. Fortunately, it works with the 
     reader who has understood it. If it does not work, 
     the reader has not understood.
     We cannot argue as to whether the sun is shining, 
     we must go and see. In the case here presented, 
     arguments alone are also not legitimate.”; 
            ── Alfred Korzybski
   ____________________________________

Gary Klein, Sources of power : how people make decision, 1998       [ ]

p.157
This was not a matter of intelligence. It was a matter of experience.7 

p.157
That's because “it” is not a fact (the Civil War began in 1861) or an insight (dividing one number into another is like subtracting it several times). You cannot learn just by being told or learn it all of a sudden. It takes lots of experience, and lots of variety in that experience, to notice differences. 

pp.158-159

p.158
   Four components of metacognition seem most important:  memory limitation, having the big picture, self-critiques, and strategy selection.8 

p.158
They can also factor in their level of alertness, their ability to sustain concentration, and so forth. 

p.158
   Experts are not only better at forming situation awareness and seeing the big picture, but they can detect when they are starting to lose the big picture. Rather than waiting until they have become hopelessly confused, experts sense any slippage and make the necessary adaptations. 

p.158
Experts also seem more likely to critique their judgments and their plans, since they can use their experience to see where the judgments might be wrong and their plans weak. 

p.159
   Using these abilities, experts can think about their own thinking to change their strategies. Regardless of whether they want to avoid memory limitations, loss of the big picture, continued performance difficulties, or poor judgements and plans, experts try to find more robust strategies. 

p.159
Everyone needs some experience with a task before they can anticipate where they will run into trouble. They need to have some experience with different strategies for handling a task in order to learn about their own abilities, both strengths and weaknesses, so they can take these into account. 

   (Klein, Gary, Sources of power : how people make decision / Gary Klein., 1. decision-making., 1998, 2001, 685.403, MIT Press, )
   ____________________________________

david a. kolb
case western reserve university


EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING

experience as the source of learning and development


Chapter Two
The process of experiential learning

     In experiential learning theory, the transactional relationship between the person and the environment is symbolized in the dual meanings of the term experience — one subjective and personal, referring to the person's internal state, as in the "the experience of joy and happiness," and the other objective and environmental, as in, "He has 20 years of experience on this job."  These two forms of experience interpenetrate and interrelate in very complex ways, as, for example, in the old saw, "He doesn't have 20 years experience, but one year repeated 20 times." ([ see machine learning - reflect on the volume of data a machine learning system needs to get the accuracy to over 70% - compare that to human as a biological learning machine ]) (["He doesn't have 20 years experience, but one year experience with 20 years of diversity, variation and variety."]) Dewey describes the matter this way:

—<begin citation, John Dewey>

                Experience does not go on simply inside a person.  It does go on there, for it influences the formation of attitudes of desire and purpose.  But this is not the whole of the story.  Every genuine experience has an active side which changes in some degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had.  The difference between civilization and savagery, to take an example on a large scale, is found in the degree in which previous experiences have changed the objective conditions under which subsequent experiences take place.  The existence of roads, of means of rapid movement and transportation, tools, implements, furniture, electric light and power, are illustrations.  Destroy the external conditions of present civilized experience, and for a time our experience would relapse into that of barbaric peoples . . . .
                The word "interaction" assigns equal rights to both factors in experience — objective and internal conditions.  Any normal experience is an interplay of these two sets of conditions.  Taken together . . . they form what we call a situation.
                The statement that individuals live in a world means, in the concrete, that they live in a series of situations.  And when it it said that they live in these situations, the meaning of the word "in" is different from its meaning when it is said that pennies are "in" a pocket or paint is "in" a can.  It means, once more, that interaction is going on between an individual and objects and other persons.  The conceptions of situation and of interaction are inseparable from each other.  An experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic or event, the subject talked about being also a part of the situation; the book he is reading (in which his environing conditions at the time may be England or ancient Greece or an imaginary region); or the materials of an experiment he is performing.  The environment, in other words, is whatever conditions interact with personal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experience which is had.  Even when a person builds a castle in the air he is interacting with the objects which he constructs in fancy. [Dewey, 1938, p. 39, 43-43]

——<end citation, John Dewey>

     (David A. Kolb, 1984, Experiential Learning : experience as the source of learning and development, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.)
(Chapter Two, The process of experiential learning, )
   ____________________________________

Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002 

p.168
But about a year later, when I was back in the States, I saw a long article in the New York Times Magazine describing the difficulties of pacifying a VC district, Rach Kien.  At first I thought it was reporting the operation I had been in.  But it was about a different battalion, 8 months later.  All the problems and experiences sounded very familiar.  The article said that Rach Kein had always been a Vietcong district up till then, and this was the first time American troops had tried to operate there. 
   In this guerrilla war in the delta all the attacks were turning out to be hit-and-run.  Usually a few shots from snipers or one or two heavier volleys would come from a clump of trees and brush or a tree line or a patch of forest bordering a paddy.  One or two of our troops, or none, would be hit. 

p.153
Without a single known enemy casualty at the end of 12 days, there were nine American dead and 23 wounded. 

p.153
The radioman's tall whip antenna made him the first target of snipers.  We lost four in the battalion while was there. 

p.154
Out of a continuous drumroll of shooting from the firing line, the shot aimed precisely in your direction sounds distinctly different ── a sharp, flat crack ── from one fired at the next target just a few feet away, one side or the other.

p.185
There was the fast turnover in personnel and the lack of institutional memory at any level. 

pp.185─186 
; an operation eight months later in the same paddies that was not even aware American troops had ever visited them before.  AS Tran Ngoc Chau said to me in 1968, “You Americans feel you have been fighting this was for seven years. You have not. You have been fighting it for one year, seven times.”

   (Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
   ____________________________________

Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002 

pp.185─186 
; an operation eight months later in the same paddies that was not even aware American troops had ever visited them before.  AS Tran Ngoc Chau said to me in 1968, “You Americans feel you have been fighting this was for seven years. You have not. You have been fighting it for one year, seven times.”

p.188
David Halberstam and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
the policy of one more step 
each new step always promising the success which the previous last step had also promised but had unaccountably failed to deliver.
Each step in the deepening of the American commitment was reasonably regarded at the time as the last that would be necessary. 

p.189
This included Truman's decision to support the French effort directly in 1950, Eisenhower's commitment to Diem in 1954, and Kennedy's decision to break through the Geneva ceiling on U.S. advisers in 1961.
   Within a month of working from the files in the McNamara study offices, I had discovered that this assumption was mistaken.  Every one of these crucial decisions was secretly associated with realistic internal pessimism, deliberately concealed from the public, just as in 1964─65.

([  David Halberstam, The coldest winter

David Halberstam, The coldest winter : America and the Korean war, [2007]

Matt Ridgway
pp.488─489
There were at least three moments  in his career when his country  had reason think of him as someone who, by dint of intelligence and character, set himself apart from his peers. 
The first was when he lead the airborne assault on France on D-day in June 1944.
The second was in 1954, after elite French forces had been trapped by the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu and pressures grew on the Americans to come to their aid. 
p.489
The second was in 1954, after elite French forces had been trapped by the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu and pressures grew on the Americans to come to their aid.  At that time, as chief of staff of the Army, he wrote a memo so forceful in assessing the extremely high cost of an American entry into the war in French Indochina (and the potential lack of popularity among the Vietnamese of such a war) that President Dwight Eisenhower, on reading it, put aside any idea of intervention. 

p.489
   But there was an earlier, perhaps even more instructive moment that caught his character perfectly, thought the military historian Ken Hamburger.  By June 1944, he was already the Great Ridgway and people listened to him.  But in September 1943, he had managed to talk his superiors out of what would surely have been an ill-fated and tragic airborne assault on Rome.  He had done that at a moment when he had comparatively little status in the upper echelons of the military hierarchy.  It was in the middle of the Italian campaign, and the Italian government, officially still part of the Axis along with Germany and Japan, was about to make a separate peace with the Allies.  Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Italian commander, had suggested that an American airborne division make a parachute jump into Rome to link up with the Italian army, which would then turn its guns on the Germans.  Ridgway's division was slate to make the jump, but to him, everything about the plan smelled wrong.  He had no way to validate the words of Badoglio ── would he do as promised, and even if he did, would it make any difference, given the formidable quality of the German troops in the Italian capital?  The risk to his men, Ridgway thought was unacceptable.  So he had begun to fight his way through a rather casual command structure that was all too ready to take Badoglio's word at face value. 
p.489
   Even as D-day for his mission approached, with all his superiors signed on, surprisingly few questions had been asked about Badoglio's ability to pull off his sudden switch.
When Ridgway first challenged his superiors, they were initially quite indifferent to his concerns.  
At the last minute, Ridgway sent one of his deputies, Maxwell Taylor, on a daring mission behind German lines to meet with the Italians and recon the situation.  Better, he believed, Taylor's eyes and ears than Badoglio's promises.  
pp.489─490
Taylor reported back that all of Ridgway's doubts were valid:  the Italians were in no position to fight as promised, and his airborne division might well be completely destroyed.  
p.490
Then, with his men already in their planes and the engines warming up, the mission was called off.  That night Ridgway had shared a bottle of whiskey with a close friend, and then, drained by the closeness of disaster, he began to cry. 
‘’•─“”

([  Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and plowshares

Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and plowshares, [1972]

At the last minute, Ridgway sent one of his deputies, Maxwell Taylor, on a daring mission behind German lines to meet with the Italians and recon the situation.  Better, he believed, Taylor's eyes and ears than Badoglio's promises.  

 4  missions in Italy                   56

pp.489─490
Taylor reported back that all of Ridgway's doubts were valid:  the Italians were in no position to fight as promised, and his airborne division might well be completely destroyed.  


contents

illustrations                         11
acknowledgements                      13
foreward                              15

 1  gestation of a second lieutenant    21
 2  preparation for high command        29
 3  the sicilian campaign               44
 4  missions in Italy                   56
 5  D day in Normandy                   70
 6  the Arnhem operation                85
 7  from the Bulge to Berchtesgaden     97
 8  superintendent of west point       112
 9  u.s. commander, Berlin             123
10  with the 8th army in Korea         131
11  post armistice Korea               149
12  army chief of staff                164
13  the bay of pigs                    178
14  the cuba report                    184
15  military representative of the president     195
16  nato problems                      204
17  southeast asia: 1961               216
18  mission to Saigon                  227
19  return to uniform                  245
20  CUba ── the secret crisis          261
21  Cuba quarantine                    271 
22  limited test ban treaty            282
23  the autumn of disaster             288
24  chairman JCS under president Johnson         304
25  Saigon kaleidoscope                315
26  playing a losing game              329 
27  the new strategy                   339 
28  end of mission                     348
29  presidential consultant            358
30  Vietnam preoccupations:  1966      367  
31  Vietnam:  1967                     374
32  the climatic year:  1968           381
33  lame-duck  consultant              393
34  lessons from Vietnam               399
35  adjustment to declining power      409 
 
index                                  423 

p.370
, there were three kinds of ground warfare
a so-called big war between the tactical units of both sides which was quite similar to the conventional combat we had known in Korea; 
a local war of guerrilla bands whose operations suggested the raids of Quantrill and his men along the MIssouri-Kansas border in our civil war; 
assassination, kidnapping, and other forms of terrorism as a calculated means of [...] for intimidating the civil population. 

books by Maxwell D. Taylor
   Swords and plowshares
   Responsibility and response
   The uncertain trumpet 

   Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and plowshares   ])

p.490
Matt Ridgway
operation killer, 
Later he wrote, “I did not understand why it was objectionable to acknowledge the fact that war was concerned  with killing the enemy .... I am by nature opposed to any effort to ‘sell’ war to people as an only mildly unpleasant business that requires very little in the way of blood.”

pp.499─500
George Allen ── who as a young CIA field officer in Vietnam briefed Ridgway daily for several weeks as the French war in Indochina was coming to its climax in 1954, later said he had never dealt with a man so acute and demanding, not even Walter Bedell Smith, who had been Dwight Eisenhower's tough guy in Europe and later took over the CIA.   Ridgway's sense of the larger picture was so accurate, Allen believed, because of his determination to get the smallest details right.  It was Ridgway's subsequent report on what entering the war in Indochina would mean ── 500,000 to 1,000,000 men, 40 engineering battalions, and significant increases in the draft ── that helped keep America out of the war for a time.  

pp.499─500
Ridgway's obsession with intelligence.
; he was simply smarter than most great commanders.
, his belief that the better your intelligence, the fewer of your own men's lives you were likely to sacrifice.
A great deal of it was his training in the airborne, where you made dangerous drops behind enemy lines with limited firepower and were almost always outnumbered and vulnerable to larger enemy forces.
George Allen ── who as a young CIA field officer in Vietnam briefed Ridgway daily for several weeks as the French war in Indochina was coming to its climax in 1954, later said he had never dealt with a man so acute and demanding, not even Walter Bedell Smith, who had been Dwight Eisenhower's tough guy in Europe and later took over the CIA.   Ridgway's sense of the larger picture was so accurate, Allen believed, because of his determination to get the smallest details right.  It was Ridgway's subsequent report on what entering the war in Indochina would mean ── 500,000 to 1,000,000 men, 40 engineering battalions, and significant increases in the draft ── that helped keep America out of the war for a time.  

  ( The coldest winter : America in the Korean war / David Halberstam.──1st ed.; 1. korean war, 1950─1953──united states., DS 919.H35 2007, 951.904'240973──dc22, [2007], )

   David Halberstam, The coldest winter  ])

p.189
─“”

p.190
That contradiction dissolved as soon as I held in my hands Taylor's actual, personal recommendations to the president and the judgements on which he based them.  The press accounts of the time had simply been wrong.  The official statements were lies.

p.193
   I soon got a crucial commentary on this Kennedy paradox, as I thought of it, from his brother. 

pp.193─196
I was glad to have the chance to tell him what I had seen and what I thought should be done, but I also wanted to ask him about the period I was investigating for the McNamara study, the Kennedy decision making in 1961. 
   I told him briefly why I had picked that year to study and how I was now more puzzled than ever by the combination of decisions I found the president had made.  In rejecting ground troops and a formal commitment to victory, he had been rejecting the urgent advice of every one of his top military and civilian officials.  With hindsight, that didn't look foolish; it was the advice that looked bad.  Yet he did proceed to deepen our involvement, in the face of a total consensus among his advisers that without the measures he was rejecting, in fact without adopting them immediately, our effort were bound to fail. 
   I told Bobby it was hard to make sense out of that combination of decisions.  Did he remember how it came out that way?  I felt uneasy about describing the problem that way to the president's brother, but I knew it might be my only opportunity ever to get an answer, and his manner with me encouraged me to take the chance. 
   He thought about what I'd put to him for a moment and then said, “We didn't want to lose in Vietnam or get out. We wanted to win if we could. But my brother was determined never to send ground combat units to Vietnam.”  His brother was convinced, Bobby said, that if he did that, we'd be in the same spot as the French.  The Vietnamese on our side would leave the fighting to the United States, and it would become our war against nationalism and self-determination, whites against Asians.  That was a fight we couldn't win, any more than the French. 

pp.195─196
   But what wasn't clear to me was how Kennedy could have been so prescient in 1961, or where he would have gotten such a strong personal commitment, as to draw an absolute line against American ground combat in Vietnam.  Bobby had not said that his brother had already decided in 1961 to withdraw from Vietnam; he had simply told me that JFK preferred and intended to do that rather than to send ground troops, if it came to the point where those seemed the only two alternatives to imminent military defeat.  I hadn't heard any American ── among those reluctant to get out of Vietnam, for cold war reasons ── advancing that precise point of view before 1964 (though some, notably George Ball, didn't want to send even advisers).  Obviously none of Kennedy's most senior advisers shared it.  I also hadn't thought of JFK as having idiosyncratic opinions, let alone a conviction like that, about Indochina.  I asked, a little impudently, “What made him so smart?”
   Whap!  His hand slapped down on the desk.  I jumped in my chair.  “Because we were there!”  He slammed the desktop again.  His face contorted in anger and pain.  “We were there, in 1951. We saw what was happening to the French. We saw it. My brother was determined, determined, never to let that happen to us.”

pp.196─197
I wondered after listening to Bobby just what they had seen and heard in Vietnam that had shaped his thinking so strongly (and so well, as it looked to me by this time).   
How long had they been there? 
It was years before I learned the answer.
   One day, it turns out.  According to Richard Reeves, Kennedy recalled that day to Taylor and Rostow just before they left for Vietnam in October 1961. 

<start of block quote>
Kennedy told Taylor about his own experiences in Vietnam, which he had visited for a day in 1951 as a young congressman on an around-the-world tour.  He had begun that day in Saigon with the commander of the 250,000 French troops fighting Viet Minh guerrillas.  General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had assured him that his soldiers could not lose to these natives.  He had ended the evening on top of the Caravelle Hotel with a young American consular officer named Edmund Gullion.  The sky around the city flashed with the usual nighttime artillery and mortar bombardment by the Viet Minh.
   “What have you learned here?” Kennedy asked the diplomat.
   “That in 20 years there will be no more colonies”, Gullion had said.  “We're going nowhere out here. The French have lost. If we come in here and do the same thing we will lose, too, for the same reason. There's no will or support for this kind of war back in Paris. THe home front is lost. The same thing would happen us.”
<end of block quote>

   Ask the right person the right question, and you could get the picture pretty fast.  

Reeves, Richard.  President kennedy : profile of power.  new york: simon and schuster, 1993.  
─“”

   (Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
   ____________________________________

Leonard-Barton Dorothy.
  Deep smarts : how to cultivate and transfer enduring business wisdom / by Dorothy Leonard and Walter Swap.
1. mentoring in business.
2. executive coaching. 
includes bibliographical references

p.32
    What happen if we perceive something, but there is nothing in our memory to link it to ── nothing that helps us make sense of what we see or experience?  

p.33
We all have these blank spots in our brains ── gaps in our experience that make it difficult for us to process a totally new experience. 
([ a totally new experience would be alienating, so foreign that it is off putting, no way to process the experience ])
([ a totally new experience as in a modern warfare, or the victim of air bombardment, unrelenting multiple rocket attacks, artillery bombardment, nuclear bomb explosion would very likely create trauma ])
([ the closest thing to a gun explosion in nature would be a thunder clap ])
([ a howling wind of a category 5 tornado or typhoon would be loud also ])
([ then we have the novelty and inventive item and/or ideas, some thing that is new, but familiar enough that it is not totally strange (foreign, alien); this is the newness the authors is most likely talking about; in fact, human like this kind of newness; there is actually a kind of sweet spot for this type of novelty (newness, neo); some thing that is new, different, ... enough that it capture our curiosity (turn on), and not so new, different, and strange that would turn us off ])
([ should be put in the context of Zen buddhism “the beginner's mind”])
([ evolutionary context ])
([ how does a baby learn? ])
In fact, information does not become knowledge until it connects with something we already know.  This is what is meant by the popular comment that some information “went over my head”.
([
http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/EP-primer.html
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/steen/cogweb/ep/EP-primer.html
Evolutionary Psychology :  A Primer
Leda Cosmides & John Tooby
Co-Directors
Center for Evolutionary Psychology
University of California, Santa Barbara
 ... ... ...
 ... ... ...
Now that we have dispensed with this preliminary throat-clearing, it is time to explain the theoretical framework from which the Five Principles -- and other fundamentals of evolutionary psychology -- were derived.
http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/EP-primer.html
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/steen/cogweb/ep/EP-primer.html
   ])

p.33
where there is nothing in the learner's memory to which a new experience, topic, or concept can be tied.  

Dorothy Leonard and Walter Swap., Deep smarts : how to cultivate and transfer enduring business wisdom, 2004
   ____________________________________

David A. Kolb, Experiential Learning, 1984                            [ ]

     ...  We are all psychologists, historians, and atomic physicists.  It is just that some of our theories are more crude and incorrect than others.  But to focus solely on the refinement and validity of these theories misses the point.  The important point is that the people we teach have held these beliefs, whatever their quality, and that until now they have used them whenever the situation called for them, to be atomic physicists, historians, or whatever.
     Thus, one's job as an educators is not only to implant new ideas but also to dispose of or modify old ones.  In many cases, resistance to new ideas stems from their conflict with old beliefs ... .  If the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas into the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated. Piaget (see Elkind, 1970, Chapter 3) has identified two mechanisms by which new ideas are adopted by an individual — integration and substition.  Ideas that evolve through integration tend to become highly stable parts of the person's conception of the world.  On the other hand, when the content of a concept changes by means of substitution, there is always the possibility of a reversion to the earlier level of conceptualization and understanding, or to a dual theory of the world where espoused theories learned through substitution are incongruent with theories-in-use that are more integrated with the person's total conceptual and attitudinal view of the world.  It is this latter outcome that stimulated Argyris and Schon's inquiry into the effectiveness of professional education:

—<begin citation, Argyris and Schon>

                We thought the trouble people have in learning new theories may stem not so much from the inherent difficulty of the new theories as from the existing theories people have that already determine practices.  We call their operational theories of action theories-in-use [what people do] to distinguish them from the espoused theories that are used to describe and justify behaviour [what people say 'they do', and give a plausible story to explain why they did what they did]. [Argyris and Schon, 1974, p. viiii]

——<end citation, Argyris and Schon>

     (David A. Kolb, 1984, Experiential Learning : experience as the source of learning and development, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.)
(Chapter Two, The process of experiential learning, p.35)
   ____________________________________

Charles I. Gragg sagely noted, "We cannot effectively use the insight of others; it must be our knowledge and insight that we use."

"We cannot effectively use the insight of others; it must be our knowledge and insight that we use."

http://www.hbs.edu/teaching/inside-hbs/

    Inside the Case Method

The development of judgment and leadership, based on sound analysis rooted in facts, is a core objective of the educational process at HBS.
    The case method is rooted in Harvard Business School's original vision. Edwin Gay, first Dean of HBS, called it the "problem method" and foresaw its value in creating leaders able to adjust as necessary to ever-changing business climates. From its inception a century ago, the School established two important pedagogical principles. First, it would use cases as teaching vehicles and not rely on lectures and readings. Second, it would engage the students in the learning process by getting them to teach themselves and each other. Today, although we also make use of lectures, simulations, fieldwork, and other forms of teaching as appropriate, more than 80 percent of HBS classes are built on the case method.
    Judgment, based on sound analysis rooted in facts, is what our students need to absorb from their education. But, as the late HBS professor Charles I. Gragg sagely noted, "We cannot effectively use the insight of others; it must be our knowledge and insight that we use." By applying the case method to business education, we break the boundaries of passive learning to encourage students to become active participants in their own progress. With each case, students empathize with a decision maker ("the protagonist"), analyze varied and frequently ambiguous data, and assume responsibility for an action plan that effectively resolves the case's business challenge.
   ____________________________________

      Manifesto for Agile Software Development
 
      We are uncovering better ways of developing 
      software by doing it and helping others do it. 
      Through this work we have come to value: 

INDIVIDUALS and INTERACTIONS over processes and tools  
            WORKING SOFTWARE over comprehensive documentation 
      CUSTOMER COLLABORATION over contract negotiation
        RESPONDING to CHANGE over following a plan 

      That is, while there is value in the items on 
      the right, we value the items on the left more. 
   ____________________________________

An introduction to buddhism

An introduction to buddhism : teachings on the four noble truths, the eight verses on training the mind, and the lamp fo the path to enlightenment 
 The Dalai Lama
translated by Thupten Jinpa 

2004, 2003, 2018

pp.68-70
p.68
   When dealing with the everyday world, or “conventional reality” as it is called in Buddhist texts, naturally there is bound to be a large area of commonality between Buddhist and scientific explanations.  Where we find empirical evidence suggesting something to be the case, we must accept its validity because we are engaging in a common area of analysis.  
However, this is not to say that Buddhists believe that all phenomena [a fact, event, or condition that can be observed or perceived] can be understood simply by using our critical faculty and our ordinary mind, certainly not. 
p.69
Given the limits of our present cognitive ability, certain facts and phenomena may well lie outside the scope of our cognition, at least for the time being. 

phenomena [fact, event, or condition that can be experience by the senses (the brain, the nervous system, and the sensory organs: sight (eyes), sound (ears), feel (skin, body), smell (nose), taste (mouth, tongue, nose), feel (gut, stomach, air pressure (ears, body), ...)]

p.69
   In Buddhism, therefore, a distinction is made between three classes of phenomena.  One class of phenomena, known as “the evident”, comprises those phenomena that can be directly perceived through our sense and so on. 
The second is the class of “the slightly obscured”; phenomena that we can understand through inference, using reasoning of different phenomena. 
THe third category, known as “the extremely obscured”, refers to facts and phenomena which lie beyond our present ability to cognize. 
For the time being, an understanding of such phenomena can only arise on the basis of the testimony of someone who has gained direct experience of them; our acceptance of their validity has to be based initialy upon this valid testimony of a third person. 

p.69
   I often give an analogy to illustrate this third category of phenomena.  Most of us know our date of birth yet we did not acquire the knowledge of this fact first-hand.  We learned it through the testimony of our parents or someone else.  We accept it through the testimony of our parents or someone else.  We accept it as a valid statement because there is no reason why our parents should lie to us about this, and also because we rely on their words as authoritative figures.  Of course, sometimes there are exceptions to this rule.  For example, sometimes people increase their age to qualify for retirement benefits or reduce their age when seeking employment, and so on.  But generally we accept the testimony of a third person that such-and-such date is our date of birth. 

pp.69-70
   Buddhists accept this third class of “extremely obscured” phenomena on the basis of the scriptural authority of the Buddha.  However, our acceptance of that authority is not a simplistic one.  We don't just say, “Oh, the Buddha was a very holy person and since he said this I believe it to be true”.  There are certain underlying principles involved in the Buddhist acceptance of scripture-based authority.  One of these is the principle of the four reliances, which is generally stated as follows: 
   Rely on the teaching, not  on the person;
   Rely on the meaning, not on the word;
   Rely on the definitive meaning, not on the provisional;
   Rely on your wisdom mind, not on your ordinary mind.

p.70
On the basis of this principle of the four reliances we subject the authority of the Buddha, or any other great teacher, to critical analysis by examining the validity of their statements in other areas, especially those that in principle lend themselves to rational enquiry and empirical observation.  In addition, we must also examine the integrity of these authoritative figures to establish that they have no ulterior motive for disseminating falsehoods or making the specific claims that we are examining.  It is on the basis of such a thorough assessment that we accept the authority of the third person on questions that at present lie outside the scope of our ordinary mind to comprehend. 

An introduction to buddhism : teachings on the four noble truths, the eight verses on training the mind, and the lamp fo the path to enlightenment 
by The Dalai Lama
translated by Thupten Jinpa 
2004, 2003, 2018
   ____________________________________

“dependent origination”
“causal interdependence.”
[Pratītyasamutpāda][all things is dependence upon other things]
Everything effects everything else.  We are part of this system.
this process of dependent origination—causal relationships effected by everything that happens around us 

 ─ everything exists because of a prior cause
 ─ therefore, their existence  is without independent origination
 ─ lacking of independent origination
 ─ devoid of independent origination
 ─ “emptiness” of independent origination
 ─ lacking independent existence
 ─ all things arise from / upon other things
 ─ There is a combination of causes and conditions that is necessary for things to happen.
 ─ This principle is invariable and stable. 

in the affair of humanity and of other things, in human activities, I dare say, from most to all (n = whole set) cases, causes and conditions  come (arise)  from some things, came from some where, has a history, does not come out of nothing; immaculate conception and then birth is unlikely; there is parentage, a bloodline, hereditary; thus, the principle of dependent origination would apply.  

 Things don’t just happen. There is a combination of causes and conditions that is necessary for things to happen. This is really important in terms of our inner experience. It is not unusual to have the experience of ending up some­where, and not knowing how we got there. And feeling quite powerless because of the confusion present in that situation. Understanding how things come together, how they interact, actually removes that sense of powerless­ness or that sense of being a victim of life or helplessness. Because if we understand how things come together, we can also begin to understand the way out, how to find another way of being, and realize that life is not random chaos.

 The basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things. 

sources:
         • An introduction to buddhism : teachings on the four noble truths, the eight verses on training the mind, and the lamp fo the path to enlightenment 
by The Dalai Lama
translated by Thupten Jinpa 
         • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prat%C4%ABtyasamutp%C4%81da
           https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pratītyasamutpāda
           Pratītyasamutpāda (Sanskrit: 𑀧𑁆𑀭𑀢𑀻𑀢𑁆𑀬𑀲𑀫𑀼𑀢𑁆𑀧𑀸𑀤, Pāli: paṭiccasamuppāda), commonly translated as dependent origination
         • https://www.buddhistinquiry.org/article/dependent-origination/        
   ____________________________________

all things are connected, but most are loosely connected 

From 
        Evolving Reactions: 60 Years with March and Simon’s
‘Organizations’
written by Karl E. Weick, University of Michigan
Journal of Management Studies

   ...  ...  ... 
   ...  ...  ... 
   ...  ...  ... 


units are tight within and loose between.


THE MOSAIC FORM
‘Modules’ and ‘programmes’ are prominent nouns in ‘Organizations’. Equally prominent are portrayals of organizational fragments. These portrayals describe sub-units as self-contained, loosely coupled, segmented, departmentalized, decentralized, all of which represent a composite organization (p. 195). The prevailing image is one of tight, self-contained, loosely connected units. This image resembles that of a mosaic, as M&S notice:  ‘The whole pattern of programmed activity in an organization is a complicated mosaic of programme executions, each initiated by its appropriate program-evoking step’ (p. 149, italics added). As they say further on, ‘Since there are limits on the power,

K. E. Weick

speed and capacity of human cognition, most human behavior in organizations is constituted by a “mosaic of programs”’ (p. 172, italics added).  The image of a mosaic is shorthand for the observation that units, of whatever kind, are tight within and loose between. This insight, eventually expanded into the idea that organizations are loosely coupled systems (e.g., Glassman, 1973; Orton and Weick, 1990), was anticipated when M&S discussed simplification. When people with cognitive limits encounter complex problems, they scale down their action programs. ‘(E)ach action program is capable of being executed in semi-independence of the others – they are only loosely coupled together’ (p. 169).
     In a mosaic the whole does not precede the parts. Instead, the whole is a collection of parts that don’t lose their individuality when connected. In an interesting phrasing, M&S observe that it takes efficient communication to ‘tolerate interdependence’ (p.162). This is one reason why M&S are able to get so much mileage out of concepts anchored in individual behaviour. Organizations aggregate ‘very large numbers of elements, each element, taken by itself, being exceedingly simple’ (p. 178). The working assumption seems to be that an organization is a mosaic of loosely coupled subunits whose members are more or less likely to invoke a shared mental set when assigned a task. Said differently, organizations can be portrayed as differentiated tight modules connected loosely by influence processes. There is a timeless quality to this basic pattern which accounts, in part, for its continuing relevance.
     For example, the basic pattern is evident in Simon’s (1962) ‘empty world hypothesis’ – most things are only weakly connected with most other things (p. 111). That pattern of tight within stable sub-assemblies and loose between them, was evident in 1958 when M&S discussed planning (pp. 176–7). If the world is empty and most events are unrelated to other events, then local changes in action programmes are sufficient. However, even in a mostly empty world, there are still minimal connections among programmes since ‘they all draw upon the resources of the organization’ (p. 176). As Simon was to put it later, ‘for a tolerable description of reality only a tiny fraction of all possible interactions needs to be taken into account. By adopting a descriptive language that allows the absence of something to go unmentioned, a nearly empty world can be described quite concisely.  Mother Hubbard did not have to check off the list of possible contents to say that her cupboard was bare’ (p. 473).
   ...  ...  ... 



source:
        Evolving Reactions: 60 Years with March and Simon’s
‘Organizations’
written by Karl E. Weick, University of Michigan
Journal of Management Studies
doi: 10.1111/joms.12289
56:8 December 2019

REFERENCES

   Bakken, T. and Hernes, T. (2006). ‘Organizing is both a verb and a noun: Weick meets Whitehead’.  Organization Studies, 27, 1599–616.

   Barnard, C. I. (1938). The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

   Bengtsson, B. and Hertting, N. (2014). ‘Generalization by mechanism thin rationality and ideal-type analysis in case study research’. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 44, 707–32.

   Berlin, I. (2013). The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
   
   Campbell, D. T. (1969). ‘Ethnocentrism of disciplines and the fish-scale model of omniscience’. In Sherif, M. and Sherif, C. W. (Eds), Interdisciplinary Relations in the Social Sciences, Chicago, IL: Aldine, 328–48.

   Colquitt, J. A. and Zapata-Phelan, C. P. (2007). ‘Trends in theory building and theory testing:
A five-decade study of the Academy of Management Journal’. Academy of Management Journal, 50,
1281–303.

   Davis, G. F. (2010). ‘Do theories of organizations progress?’ Organizational Research Methods, 13, 690–709.

   Davis, G. F. and Marquis, C. (2005). ‘Prospects for organization theory in the early twenty-first century: Institutional fields and mechanisms’. Organization Science, 16, 332–43.

   Farjoun, M. and Starbuck, W. H. (2007). ‘Organizing at and beyond the limits’. Organization Studies, 28, 541–66.

   Feldman, M. S. (2000). ‘Organizational routines as a source of continuous change’. Organization Science, 11, 611–29.

   Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

   Fine, G. A. (1991). ‘On the macrofoundations of microsociology: Constraint and the exterior reality of tructure’. Sociological Quarterly, 32, 161–77.
 
   Glassman, R. B. (1973). ‘Persistence and loose coupling in living systems’. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 18, 83–98.

   Hutchins, J. G. B. (1960). ‘Reviewed works: Higher education for business by Robert A. Gordon, James E. Howell; The education of American business men: A study in university-college programs in business administration by Frank C. Pierson’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 5, 279–95.

   James, W. (1987). Writings 1902–1910. New York: Library of America.
Kahneman, D. (2003). ‘Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics’. American Economic Review, 93, 1449–75.

   Kilduff, M. (1993). ‘Deconstructing organizations’. Academy of Management Review, 18, 13–31.

   Koch, S. E. (1959). Psychology: A Study of a Science. New York: McGraw Hill. 

   Lindzey, G. E. (1954). Handbook of Social Psychology. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

   March, J. G. (2008). Explorations in Organizations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

   March, J. G. and Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
Merton, R. K. (1948). ‘The self-fulfilling prophecy’. The Antioch Review, 8, 193–210.

   Merton, R. K. (1998). On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

   Orton, J. D. and Weick, K. E. (1990). ‘Loosely coupled systems: A reconceptualization’. Academy of Management Review, 15, 203–23.

   Simon, H. A. (1962). ‘The Architecture of complexity’. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106, 467–82.

   Stinchcombe, A. (1982). ‘Should sociologists forget their mothers and fathers?’ The American Sociologist, 17, 2–11.

   Thoenig, J. C. (1998). ‘Essai: How far is a sociology of organizations still needed?’ Organization Studies, 19, 307–20.

   Turner, B. A. and Pidgeon, N. F. (1997). Man-Made Disasters, 2nd edition. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

   Weick, K. E. (1979). The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd edition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

   Whyte, W. F. (1948). ‘The social structure of the restaurant’. American Journal of Sociology, 54, 302–10.

   Whyte, W. H Jr. (1956). The Organization Man. New York: Simon & Schuster.
   ____________________________________

Charles Perrow, Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies, 1999 [ ]

Perrow, Charles.
Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies / Charles Perrow
1. industrial accidents.
2. technology--risk assessment.
3. accident.

HD7262  P55  1999
363.1--dc21

pp.4-5
But suppose the system is also “tightly coupled”, that is, processes happen very fast and can't be turned off, the failed parts cannot be isolated from other parts, or there is no other way to keep the production going safely. Then recovery from the initial disturbance is not possible; it will spread quickly and irretrievably for at least some time. Indeed, operator action or the safety systems may make it worse, since for a time it is not known what the problem really is. 
   Probably many production processes started out this way──complexly interactive and tightly coupled. But with experience, better designs, equipment, and procedures appeared, and the unsuspected interactions were avoided and the tight coupled reduced. This appears to have happened in the case of air traffic control, where interactive complexity and tight coupling have been reduced by better organization and “technological fixes”. 

p.8
DEPOSE components (for design, equipment, procedures, operators, supplies and materials, and environment). 

p.8
   That accident had its cause in the interactive nature of the world for us that morning and in its tight coupling──not in the discrete failures, which are to be expected and which are guarded against with backup systems. Most of the time we don't notice the inherent coupling in our world, because most of the time there are no failures, or the failures that occur do not interact. But all of a sudden, things that we did not realize could be linked (buses and generators, coffee and a loaned key) became linked. The system is suddenly more tightly coupled than we had realized. 

p.9
In complex industrial, space, and military systems, the normal accident generally (not always) means that the interactions are not only unexpected, but are  incomprehensible  for some critical period of time. In part this is because in these human-machine systems the interactions literally cannot be seen.  In part it is because, even if they are seen, they are not believed.  As we shall find out and as Robert Jervis and Karl Weick have noted,3 seeing is not necessarily believing; sometimes, we must believe before we can see. 
   3. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university press, 1976); and Karl Wieck, “Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems”, Administrative Science Quarterly 21:1 (March, 1976): 1-19. 

p.73
1967, according to a perceptive and disturbing article by one of the editors of Nuclear Safety, E. W. Hagen.4 

p.73
Hagen concludes that potential common-mode failures are “the result of adding complexity to system designs”. Ironically, in many cases, the complexity is added to reduce common-mode failures. 
p.73
The addition of redundant components has been the main line of defense, but, as Hagen illustrates, also the main source of the failure. “To date, all proposed ‘fixes’ are for more of the same──more components and more complexity in system design.”5  The Rasmussen safety study relied upon a  “PRA” (probabilities risk analysis), finding that core melts and the like were virtually impossible. 

, finding that core melts and the like were virtually impossible. [[ see list of nuclear power plant "accident" that has core melts down ]]

p.73
The main problem is complexity itself, Hagen argues. 


pp.93-94
1. Tightly coupled systems have more time-dependent processes: they cannot wait or stand by until attended to.
Reactions, as in chemical plants, are almost instantaneous and cannot be delayed or extended. 

2. The sequences in tightly coupled systems are more invariant. 

3. In tightly coupled systems, not only are the specific sequences invariant, but the overall design of the process allows only one way to reach the production goals. 
Loosely coupled systems are said to have “equifinality”──many ways to skin the cat; tightly coupled ones have “unifinality”. 

4. Tightly coupled systems have little slack. 
In loosely coupled systems, supplies and equipment and human power can be wasted without great cost to the system. 

pp.94-95
In a tightly coupled systems the buffers and redundancies and substitutions must be designed in; they must be thought of in advance.  In loosely coupled systems there is a better chance that expedient, spur-of-the-moment buffers and redundancies and substitutes can be found, even though they were not planned ahead of time. 
p.95
But in tightly coupled systems, the recovery aids are largely limited to deliberate, designed-in aids, such as engineered safety devices (in a nuclear plant, emergency coolant pumps and an emergency supply coolant) or engineered safety features (a more general category, which would include a buffering wall between the core and the source of coolant). While some jury-rigging is possible, such possibilities are limited, because of time-dependent sequences, invariant sequences, unifinality, and the absence of slack. 
p.95
In loosely coupled systems, in addition to ESDs (emergency safety device) and ESFs (engineered safety device), fortuitous recovery aids are often possible. 
p.95
Tightly coupled systems offer few such opportunities. Whether the interactions are complex or linear, they cannot be temporarily altered. 
p.95
   This does not mean that loosely coupled systems necessarily have sufficient designed-in safety devices; typically, designers perceive they have a safety margin in the form of fortuitous safety devices, and neglect to install even quite obvious ones. 

p.96
    Table 3.2
  Tight and loose coupling tedencies
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Tight Coupling                              Loose Coupling
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delays in processing not possible           Processing delays possible 
Invariant sequences                         Order of sequences can be changed
Only one method to achieve goal             Alternative methods available 
Little slack possible in supplies,          Slack in resources possible 
 equipment, personnel
Buffers and redundancies are designed-in,   Buffers and redundancies 
 deliberate                                  fortuitiously available 
Substitutes of supplies, equipment,         Substitutions fortuitously 
 personnel limited and designed-in           available 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   ( Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies / Charles Perrow, 1. industrial accidents., 2. technology--risk assessment., 3. accident., HD7262  P55  1999, 363.1--dc21, 1999,  )
   ____________________________________

purpose of this:  how do you detect a thing (a pattern) that you have not experience before? 
And the answer to that is: NO, you can not detect a thing that is complete new (alien and foreign) to Earth

    It is difficult to miss something that you have never experienced.  
    It is not possible to know:  what you do not know. 

  if you have never experienced it, then you can not missed it 

how can you miss something

 - you can miss it: if it is invisible
    · does this object exist 
    · does this object take up physical space 
    · does this object have stable molecular structure 
    · does this object follow the known fundamental physical laws of our universe 
    · does this object emits heat (infrared)   
    · how do you detect an invisible object
    · how do you detect an object that reflect no light
    · how do you detect an object that blend in with the background
    · does the object have distinctive oder (smell)
      - does the object absorb distinctive chemical 
    · does the object make distinctive sound (auditory)
      - does the object absorb sound
      - does the object scatter sound
      - does the object reflect sound
      - does the object disperse sound 
    · does the object cast a shadow 
    · does the object leave imprint, footprint, track when it moves 
    · does the object leave heat trail (infrared) 
    · does the object leave cold trail that can be distinguish from the background radiation  
    · does the object disturb the atmosphere in some way that show up as signal or noise from the baseline of background weather pattern 
    · can the object be detected during rainfall 
      · loss of stealth when the jets got wet or opened their bomb bays, made them visible on radar screens. 
    · can the object be detected in a rain storm
    · can the object be detected during snowfall
    · can the object be detected during a sand storm 
    · can the object be detected in a field of dust 
    · is the object a lighning magnet 
    · does the object interfered with electromagnetic spectrum
    · does the object disrupt television signal
    · does the object disrupt radio signal
    · does the object disrupt atmospheric communication signal
    · does the object disrupt RADAR signal
    · does the object disrupt satellite signal
    · does the object disrupt the earth magnetic field
    · does the object obey the fundamental physical laws of gravitational field 
    · does the object emits electromagnetic signals
      - does the object emits passive electromagnetic noise
      - does the object transmits electromagnetic signals 
    · can the object be detected by disruption in the atmosphere 
    · what is the object behavior regarding infrared 
    · what is the object behavior regarding ultraviolet
    · what is the object behavior regarding visible light spectrum    
    · what is the object behavior regarding radiation
    · does the object move
    · does the object have a power source 
    · does the object have a back-up power source 
    · how does the object move (travel)
      - in space 
      - over upper atmosphere 
      - over air
      - over ground
      - under ground
      - over surface water
      - under water 
    · how does the object behave under extreme heat
    · how does the object behave under extreme cold
    · how does the object behave under extreme depth of water pressure
    · how does the object behave in space, extreme cold, no moisture, no air 
 •─• five kingdoms (bacteria, protoctista, animals, fungi, and plants) 
    · how does the object smell to dog 
    · can the object be detect by certain insect 
    · can the object be detect by snake 
    · can the object be detect by ants
    · can the object be detect by bees
    · can the object be detect by bats
    · can the object be detect by bacterial cells
    · can the object be detect by eukaryotic cell 
    · can the object be detect by a virus 
 •─• five kingdoms (bacteria, protoctista, animals, fungi, and plants) 
    · does this object blend in with the background 
      - how does this object blend in with the background 
    · is this object hidden inside another object 
      - how does this object conceal inside another object 
 - you can miss it: if it is everywhere (ubiquity)

 •─• bacterial cells, which, lacking nuclei, are called prokaryotes, or prokaryotic cells.
 •─• bacteria are the source of reproduction, photosynthesis, movement
 •─• eukaryotic cell (a new more complex kind of cell appeared on the scene), of which plant and animal bodies are composed.

 - you can miss it: if it is something you have never experience 
    · how can you miss something, you have never experience (you can not)

 - how can you detect a pattern that you have not seen (experience) before 
    · answer is you can not 
   ____________________________________

Michael Pillsbury, The hundred-year marathon : China's secret strategy to replace America as the global superpower, 2015

p.113
American movie The Usual Suspects, 
“The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist.”30 
the best deception conceals its very existence. 

   (Michael Pillsbury, The hundred-year marathon, The hundred-year marathon : China's secret strategy to replace America as the global superpower / Michael Pillsbury., 1. strategic planning ── china., 2. china ── history. 3. national security ── china., 4. china ── politics and government., 5. china ── foreign relations., 6. united states ── foreign relations ── china., 7. china ── foreign relations ── united states., JZ134.P55  2014, 327.1'12095──dc23, 2015, )
   ____________________________________
   ____________________________________

Dave Oliver, Against the tide, 2014                               [ ]

p.155
    7. ... This should amply demonstrate that all management systems depending on people will occasionally (or more often) either run amuck or, more likely, fail to recognize the precise situation they were installed to detect. Rickover taught that if one does not have at least three independent check systems for what is considered important, one does not have a system. However, often no number of independent checks will suffice to discover a problem people have previously never seen. 

   (Against the tide : Rickover's leadership principles and the rise of the nuclear Navy / Rear Admiral Dave Oliver, USN (Ret.)., 1. Rickover, Hyman George., 2. admirals--united states--biography., 3. united states. navy--officers--biography., 4. nuclear submarines--united states--history--20th century., 5. nuclear warships--united states--safety measures--history., 6. marine nuclear reactor plants--united states--safety measures--history., 7. united states. navy--management., 8. leadership--united states., 2014, )
   ____________________________________
·‘’•─“”
<------------------------------------------------------------------------>
πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα
   ____________________________________
*2   “This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.”
      ──From a Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations
     (Ackoff's best : his classic writings on management, Russell L. Ackoff., © 1999, hardcover, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p.139)

   “This [copy & paste reference note] is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is [archive] with the understanding that the [researcher, investigator] is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.”
      ──From a Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations
--
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in, or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), without the prior permission of the publisher.  

The W. Edwards Deming Institute.  All rights reserved.  Except as permitted under the United States copyright act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. 

All right reserved.  No part of this book may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages or reproduce illustrations in a review with appropriate credits nor may any part of this book be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means ── electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or other ── without written permission from the publisher. 
   The information in this book is true and complete to the best of our knowlege.  All recommendations are made without guarantee on the part of the author or Storey publishing.  The author and publisher disclaim any liability in connection with the use of this information. 

NOTICE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C., section 107, some material is provided without permission from the copyright owner, only for purposes of criticism, comment, scholarship and research under the "fair use" provisions of federal copyright laws. These materials may not be distributed further, except for "fair use," without permission of the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml

notice:  Do not purchase this book with the hopes of curing cancer or any other chronic disease
   We offer it for informative purposes to help cope with health situations and do not claim this book furnishes information as to an effective treatment or cure of the disease discussed ─ according to currently accepted medical opinion.  
   Although it is your right to adopt your own dietary and treating pattern, never the less suggestions offered in this book should not be applied to a specific individual except by his or her doctor who would be familiar with individual requirements and any possible complication.  Never attempt a lengthy fast without competent professional supervision. 

the home health handbook makes every effort to insure that its information is medically accurate and up-to-date.  However, the information contained in this handbook is intended to complement, not substitute for, the advice of your own physician.  Before embarking on any medical treatment or changing your present program, you should consult with your doctor, who can discuss your individual needs, symptoms and treatment. 

All right reserved.  No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.  The Australian copyright act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10 per cent of this book, which ever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given a renumeration notice to the copyright agency (Australia) under the Act. 

No comments:

Post a Comment