Fernand Braudel

 Fernand Braudel [Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme], 1992    [ ] 

  p.613

On the other hand, the graphs quite emphatically concur about the Kondratieff cycle which follows: it begins in 1791, peaks in 1812 and reaches its lowest point in 1851. [takes about 19 years to peak, and about 40 years reach the lowest point, 19 + 40 = 59 years Kondratieff cycle]

   We may conclude that the British industrial revolution experienced two movement, roughly between 1781 and 1815, a first and second wind so to speak, the first a rather difficult period, the second easier. In very broad terms, this was also the rhythm experienced by France and the rest of the continent.

    (The perspective of the world, 1992, 909.08 Braudel, )

    (Fernand Braudel [Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme. English], civilization and capitalism, 15th - 18th century, volume III, the perspective of the world, translation from the French, by Siân Reynolds, 909.08 Braudel, [p.82, pp.86-87, p.613]  )

   ____________________________________

Theodore Modis., Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future, 1992.

p.148

  The resulting graph, Figure 8.1, presents a picture of regular oscillations.  It is so regular that a harmonic waves ── a sinusoidal ── with a fifty-six-year (56-year) time period can be made to pass very closely to most points.

p.149 

  This periodicity in energy consumption was first observed by Hugh B. Stewart.1  On several occasion before and after Stewart, economists and others have pointed out many human activities that oscillate within a period of fifty [50] to sixty [60] years.2 

p.156

[the existence of economic cycles]

A more contemporary scholar, Joseph A. Schumpeter, tried to explain the existence of economic cycles by attributing growth to the fact that major technological innovations come in clusters.10 

An extended list of references on long economic waves can be found in an article by R. Ayres.11

p.156

N. D. Kondratieff

1926

  From economic indicators alone Kondratieff deduced an economic cycle with a period of about fifty [50] years.  His work was promptly challenged.  Critics doubted both the existence of Kondratieff's cycle and the causal explanation suggested by Schumpeter.  The postulation ended up being largely ignored by contemporary economists for a variety of reasons.  In the final analysis, however, the most significant reason for this rejection may have been the boldness of the conclusions drawn from such ambiguous and imprecise data as monetary and financial indicators. 

p.156

indicators, like price 

inflation and currency fluctuations 

monetary indicators

p.156

  Concerning cycles with a period of fifty-six years I have cited examples in this chapter that are based on physical quantities.  Energy consumptions, the use of machines, the discovery of stable elements, the succession of primary energy sources and basic innovations have all been reported in their appropriate units and not in relation to their prices.  The cycles obtained this way are more trustworthy than Kondratieff's economic cycle.  In fact, in the case of energy sources, prices indeed folowed the same cycle by flaring up at the end of each boom. 

p.156

fifty-six-year economic cycle

p.169

  We then compared these natural-growth curves to the fifty-six-year {56-year} cycle of energy consumption, which coincides with the economic cycle.  We observed a remarkable correlation between the time these growth curves approach their ceiling and the valleys of the economic cycle. 

p.169

recession coincides with saturation of these technologies. 

p.170

saturation coincides with economic recession. 

p.176

Nakicenovic on the U.K. Wholesale Price Index documented since the sixteenth (16th) century. 

p.177

A periodic oscillation recorded over five centuries (500 years)

Figure 9.4

The U.K. Wholesale Price Index smoothed over a rolling 25-year period with respect to a 50-year moving average.  This procedure washes out small fluctuations and reveals a wave.  The periodicity turns out to be 55.5 years.* 

p.224

  Once growth is complete, the level reached reflects an equilibrium.  Its signature becomes an invariant or constant that, despite erratic fluctuations, 

  (Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future / Theodore Modis.,  1. forecasting., 2. creation (literary, artistic, etc.), 3. science and civilization.,  CB 158.M63, 303.49--dc20, 1992, )

   ____________________________________

Capital in the Twenty-First Century, by Thomas Piketty, 2013

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_in_the_Twenty-First_Century

https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Why-Inequality-Matters-Capital-in-21st-Century-Review

Capital in the twenty-first century / Thomas Piketty ; translated by Arthur Goldhammer.

1. capital.

2. income distribution.

3. wealth

4. labor economics.

HB501.P43613 2014

332'.041—dc23

2013 in France (la France), 2014 in United States 

Copyright © 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

First published as Le capital au XXI siècle, copyright © 2013 Éditions du Seuil

Acknowledgments

This book is based on fifteen years of research (1998–2013) devoted essentially to understanding the historical dynamics of wealth and income. Much of this research was done in collaboration with other scholars.

     ••••   •••   •••• 

Conclusion

I have presented the current state of our historical knowledge concerning the dynamics of the distribution of wealth and income since the eighteenth century, and I have attempted to draw from this knowledge whatever lessons can be drawn for the century ahead.

   The sources on which this book draws are more extensive than any previous author has assembled, but they remain imperfect and incomplete. All of my conclusions are by nature tenuous and deserve to be questioned and debated. It is not the purpose of social science research to produce mathematical certainties that can substitute for open, democratic debate in which all shades of opinion are

represented. 

The Central Contradiction of Capitalism: r > g

The overall conclusion of this study is that a market economy based on private property, if left to itself, contains powerful forces of convergence, associated in particular with the diffusion of knowledge and skills; but it also contains powerful forces of divergence, which are potentially threatening to democratic societies and to the values of social justice on which they are based. 

   The principal destabilizing force has to do with the fact that the private rate of return on capital, r, can be significantly higher for long periods of time than the rate of growth of income and output, g.

   The inequality r > g implies that wealth accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than output and wages. This inequality expresses a fundamental logical contradiction. The entrepreneur inevitably tends to become a rentier, more and more dominant over those who own nothing but their labor. Once constituted, capital reproduces itself faster than output increases. The past devours the future. 

   The consequences for the long-term dynamics of the wealth distribution are potentially terrifying, especially when one adds that the return on capital varies directly with the size of the initial stake and that the divergence in the wealth distribution is occurring on a global scale.

   The problem is enormous, and there is no simple solution. Growth can of course be encouraged by investing in education, knowledge, and nonpolluting technologies. But none of these will raise the growth rate to 4 or 5 percent a year. History shows that only countries that are catching up with more advanced economies—such as Europe during the three decades after World War II or China and other emerging countries today—can grow at such rates. For countries at the world technological frontier—and thus ultimately for the planet as a whole—there is ample reason to believe that the growth rate will not exceed 1–1.5 percent in the long run, no matter what economic policies are adopted.1

   With an average return on capital of 4–5 percent, it is therefore likely that r > g will again become the norm in the twenty-first century, as it had been throughout history until the eve of World War I. In the 20th century, it took two world wars to wipe away the past and significantly reduce the return on capital, thereby creating the illusion that the fundamental structural contradiction of capitalism (r > g) had been overcome. 

   ... ... ...

Yet it seems to me that all social scientists, all journalists and commentators, all activists in the unions and in politics of whatever stripe, and especially all citizens should take a serious interest in money, its measurement, the facts surrounding it, and its history.  Those who have a lot of it never fail to defend their interests.  Refusing to deal with numbers rarely serves the interests of the least well-off.

   ____________________________________

Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and Dennis Meadows, Limits to growth, 2004 [ ]

pp.43-44

    When we, system dynamicists, see a pattern persist in many parts of a system over long periods, we assume that it has causes embedded in the feedback loop structure of the system.  Running the same system harder or faster will not change the pattern as long as the structure is not revised.  Growth as usual has widened the gap between the rich and the poor.  Continuing growth as usual will never close the gap.  Only changing the structure of the system--the chains of causes and effect--will do that.

    What is the structure that keeps widening the gap between the rich and the poor even in the presence of enormous economic growth?  We see two generic structures at work.  The first has to do with social arrangement--some common in many cultures, some unique to particular cultures--that SYSTEMICALLY REWARD THE PRIVILEDGED WITH THE POWER AND RESOURCES TO ACQUIRE EVEN MORE PRIVILEGE.  Examples range from over to cover ethnic discrimination to tax loopholes for the wealthy; from inferior nutrition for the children of the poor to premium schooling for the children of the wealthy; from the use of money to gain political access, even in supposed democracies, to the simple fact that interest payments systematically flow from those who have less money than they need to those who have more than they need.

    In systems terms these structures are called "success to the successful" feedback loops. 17  They are positive loops that reward the successful with the means to succeed.  They tend to be endemic in any society that does not consciously implement counterbalancing structures to level the playing field.  (Example of counterbalancing structures include anti-discrimination laws, tax rates that increase as a person grows richer, universal education and health care standards, "safety nets" to support those who falls upon hard times, taxes on wealth, and democratic processes that separate politics from the influence of money).

Over the past three decades many people and organization have helped us understand how limits to material growth will shape global futures.  We dedicate this volume to three individuals whose contributions were fundamental:

AURELIO PECCEI, founder of the Club of Rome, whose profound concern for the world and undying faith in humanity inspired us and many others to care about and address the prospects for humanity's long-term future.

JAY W. FORRESTER, professor emeritus of the Sloan School of Management at MIT and our teacher.  He designed the prototype of the computer model we have used, and his profound systems insights have helped us understand the behaviors of economic and environmental systems.

Finally, it is our sad honour to dedicate this book to its main author, DONELLA H. MEADOWS.  Widely known as Dana, by all those who respected her and appreciated her work, she was a world-class thinker, writer, and social innovator.  Her high standards for communication, ethics, and service still inspire and challenge us--and thousands of others.  Much of the analysis and prose here are hers, but this book was completed after Dana's death in February 2001.  We intend that this edition will honour and advance her lifelong effort to inform the world's citizen and coax them toward sustainability.

    (Meadows, Donella H., copyright © 2004)

(Limits to growth : the 30-year update / Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and Dennis Meadows, (hardcover : alk. paper), (pbk. : alk. paper), 1. economic development--environmental aspects, 2. population--economic aspects, 3. pollution--economic aspects, 4. sustainable development, pp.43-44 )

   ____________________________________

The necessary revolution : how individual and organizations are working together to create a sustainable world,  

Peter Senge, 

Bryan Smith, Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur, Sara Schley, 

2008

p.176   mental models. 

We all hold mental models——some shared across a society, others across a social class, a political party, an industry, a particular company, or even within our own family.  What is often less clear is how these models affect, even dictate, our thoughts and actions and the thinking of those around us. 

p.174

Ways of explaining reality 

    **increasing leverage and opportunity for learning 

    ||  

    ||   Events                React

    ||   what just happened?      

    ||   

    ||   Patterns/Trends       Anticipate/expectation  

    ||   what's been happening over time? 

    ||   have we been here or some

    ||   place similar before? 

    ||

    ||   Systemic Structures   Design/co-design/co-evolution   

    ||   what are the deeper forces driving these 

    ||   patterns  or  trends and how do they arise? 

    ||   what are the forces at play 

    ||   contributing to these pathways? 

    ||   

    ||   Mental Models         Transform/re-form/re-organise/re-call   

    ||   what about our thinking 

    ||   allows this situation to persist? 

    \/

    figure 12.1 

p.177

   Why is it so important to look beneath the surface at the deeper levels of reality?  Because in our experience it is often the key to lasting change.  When people or organizations pay attention only to the visible tip of the iceberg, they can only react to change as it happens—so at best, they survive the crisis.  They often try to compensate for their lack of analysis of a problem with aggressive and "proactive" strategies.  But being "proactive" from a reactive mind-set is reactive just the same.  With long enough lever, boasted Archimedes, "I can move the world."

 

   (The necessary revolution : how individual and organizations are working together to create a sustainable world, Peter Senge, Bryan Smith, Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur, Sara Schley, 2008, 338.927 Senge, pp.172-177)

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