____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
pp.237─239
“Henry, there's something I would like to tell you, for what it's worth, something I wish I had been told years ago. You've been a consultant for a long time, and you've dealt a great deal with top secret information. But you're about to receive a whole slew of special clearances, maybe 15 or 20 of them, and I've known other people who have just acquired them, and I have a pretty good sense of what the effects of receiving these clearances are on a person who didn't previously know they even existed. And the effects of reading the information that they will make available to you.
“First, you'll be exhilarated by some of this new information, and by having it all ── so much! incredible! ── suddenly available to you. But second, almost as fast, you will feel like a fool for having studied, written, talked about these subjects, criticized and analyzed decisions made by the presidents for years without having known of the existence of all this information, which presidents and others had and you didn't, and which must have influenced their decisions in ways you couldn't even guess. In particular, you'll feel foolish for having literally rubbed shoulders for over a decade with some officials and consultants who did have access to all this information you didn't know about and didn't know they had, and you'll be stunned that they kept that secret from you so well.
“You will feel like a fool, and that will last for about two weeks. Then, after you've started reading all this daily intelligence input and become used to using what amounts to whole libraries of hidden information, which is much more closely held than mere top secret data, you will forget there ever was a time when you didn't have it, and you'll be aware only of the fact that you have it now and most others don't ... and all those other people are fools.
“Over a longer period of time ── not too long, but a matter of two or three years ── you'll eventually become aware of the limitations of this information. THere is a great deal that it doesn't tell you, it's often inaccurate, and it can lead you astray just as much as the New York Times can. But that take a while to learn.
“In the meantime it will have become very hard for you to learn from anybody who doesn't have these clearances. Because you'll be thinking as you listen to them: ‘What would this man be telling me if he knew what I know? Would he be giving me the same advice, or would it totally change his predictions and recommendations’ And that mental exercise is so torturous that after a while you give it up and just stop listening. I've seen this with my superiors, my colleagues ... and with myself.
“You will deal with a person who doesn't have those clearances only from the point of view of what you want him to believe and what impression you want him to go away with, since you'll have to lie carefully to him about what you know. In effect, you will have to manipulate him. You'll give up trying to access what he has to say. The danger is, you'll become something like a moron. You'll become incapable of learning from most people in the world, no matter how much experience they may have in their particular areas that may be much greater than yours.”
It was a speech I had thought through before, one I'd wished someone had once given me, and I'd long hoped to be able to give it to someone who was just about to enter the world of “real” executive secrecy. I ended by saying that I'd long thought of this kind of secret information as something like the potion Circe gave to the wanderers and shipwrecked men who happened on her island,
THey became incapable of human speech and couldn't help one another to find their way home.
Kissinger hadn't interrupted this long warning. As I've said, he could be a good listener, and he listened soberly. He seemed to understand that it was heartfelt, and he didn't take it as patronizing, as I'd feared. But I knew that it was too soon for him to appreciate fully what I was saying. He didn't have the clearances yet.
─‘’“”
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
p.43
It is a common place that “you can't keep secrets in Washington” or “in a democracy”, that “no matter how sensitive the secret, you're likely to read it the next day in the New York Times”. These truisms are flatly false. They are in fact cover stories, ways of flattering and misleading journalists and their readers, part of the process of keep secrets well. Of course eventually many secrets do get out that wouldn't in a fully totalitarian society. Bureaucratic rivalries, especially over budget shares, lead to leaks. Moreover, to a certain extent the ability to keep secret for a given amount of time diminishes with the number of people who know it. As secret keepers like to say, “Three people can keep a secret if two of them are dead.” But the fact is that the overwhelming majority of secrets do not leak to the American public.
This is true even when the information withheld is well known to an enemy and when it is clearly essential to the functioning of the congressional war power and to any democratic control of foreign policy. The reality unknown to the public and to most members of congress and the press is that secrets that would be of the greatest import to many of them can be kept from them reliably for decades by the executive branch, even though they are known to thousands of insiders. (see chapter 3.)
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
p.39
NoDis, referring to an office or offices specified, corresponded to eyes only for an individual or a set of individuals, supposed to be seen “only by the eyes of” the addressees named. The point was to control and direct who knew ── and shouldn't know ── in an elaborate hierarchy of responsibility and secrecy.
I was never a person named in the list of addressees of an eyes only message, nor, for that matter, was John McNaughton usually on the list. When I saw that stamp or heading, I was looking at a copy of a document that in principle, according to the designator, wasn't supposed to be copied at all, or to be seen by me or my boss. Nor was International Security Affairs or its assistant secretary (let alone his special assistant) very often among the addressess of a NoDis State dispatch. Usually no one in the Pentagon, even the secretary, was listed for receiving one of these relatively infrequent messages, which tended to be addressed to the secretary of state or the president. But there it was, in front of me, from the message center. Obviously, NoDis and eyes only were, in practice, relative terms, intended (one had to assume that the senders knew this, from their own experience) to cut the number of people who saw a particular secret or top secret message from thousands or hundreds down to scores or even dozens (apart from secretaries or couriers or special assistants).
To get below even that, senders sometimes put rather desperate warnings in the heading, in capitals, “Literally eyes only of the secretary” or “the President”. I was aware of this of course because I was reading it, and I hadn't stolen it, nor had I made the copy that I was reading.
pp.39─40
I gave him the cable number and mentioned that it was from a new series of weekly reports the ambassador was sending personally. It had a special slug, or code word, to designate the series, limiting the distribution, presumably very severely. But I was getting my own copy, as was McNaughton. I told Forrestal these were very interesting, and he should make sure he got on the list.
p.40
(The only sense I could make subsequently of the sensitivity on this was that the code word list must have been devised at Ambassador Maxwell Taylor's request ── for some personal reason that I never learned ── to allow him to communicate to his two bosses in private, specifically keeping the information from his former White House colleague Forrestal.)
p.40
Meanwhile he paid a continuing price for my error. This particular set of messages was no longer sent to his office. Only one copy of these came to the Pentagon, to Secretary McNamara's office. McNaughton had to go there to read the copies, on a clipboard from which he couldn't remove them.
That's how you learn.
pp.79─81
McNaughton kept next to his desk a bookstand with a row of his most frequently referred to and most sensitive directives, cables, estimates, and memoranda compiled into separate binders and three-ring notebooks. It was on rollers, so that when he left late each evening it could be easily moved from his desk into the closet-size, floor-to-ceiling safe that lined the outer wall of his room, along with the library shelves of classified documents stored there. Each morning before he arrived, his military aide unlocked the safe, which had a top secret combination lock, and wheeled his stand of personal reading materials over to his desk, so that he could reach a reference file easily from his chair.
I had access to the materials on this shelf, as I did to anything in the piles of paper on John's desk. But since he wanted instant access to these when he was at his desk, I rarely, if ever, took one of these binders out of his office into my cubbyhole a few steps away. I had copies of most of these same materials in my own safe. But if I needed to refer to something on his personal shelf, I would walk into his office ── if he didn't have a red light showing in the row of lights above his door ── pull it out, and look at it, standing next to his desk, while he worked away. His power of concentration was such that this didn't bother him, if it was carried out quietly and without my saying anything to him. Even so, I generally did that when he wasn't in the office. Since I often worked later than he did, I had the combination to his closet safe, so I could wheel the stand back into it when I was ready to leave the office. As far as I knew, the only others who had that combination, apart from John, were his military aides.
One day in the late spring his chief military aide abruptly left the office. I never heard an explanation for his apparent firing, but the first sign was that his assistant, the junior military aide, gave me a new combination to McNaughton's office safe. It had been changed that morning, the day of the colonel's departure. Sometime before that, though I hadn't made any connection at the time, John had pointed out to me a large binder at the lefthand end of his personal shelf that he asked me not to look in. The label on it was something to the effect of “Vietnam, McNaughton eyes only”. I could use anything else on the stand or in his files, but these were really for his eyes only. He told me it held papers that he had been directed not to share with anyone else at all, and in this case that included me.
p.81
For a number of such nights, I didn't think of looking into the binder that was out of bounds. But John was asking me not to look at high-level policy papers, on Vietnam, in 1965, never to try to find out what was really going on among the “principals”, what they were considering and proposing, what they were writing to one another, even when, it seemed, I could do so without anyone's knowing.
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
Theodore Modis., Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future, 1992.
pp.37-38
p.37
Critics of S-curves have always raised the question of uncertainties as the most serious argument against forecasts of this kind.
p.37
Obviously the more good-quality measurements available, the more reliable the determination of the final ceiling. But I would not dismiss the method for fear of making a mistake.
p.37
Alain Debecker and I carried out a systematic study of the uncertainties to be expected as a function of the number of data points, their measurement errors, and how much of the S-curve they cover.
p.37
We did this in the physics tradition through a computer program simulating “historical” data along S-curves smeared with random deviations, and covering a variety of conditions. The subsequent fits aimed to recover the original S-curve.
p.37
We left the computer running over the weekend.
pp.37-38
On Monday morning we had piles of printout containing over forty thousand fits.
p.38
The results were published,12 and a summary of them is given in Appendix B, but the rule of thumb is as follows:
If the measurements cover about half of the life cycle of the growth process in question and the error per point is not bigger than 10 percent, nine times out of ten the final niche capacity will turn out to be less than 20 percent away from the forecasted one.
p.38
The results of our study were both demystifying and reassuring. The predictive power of S-curves is neither magical nor worthless.
p.50
1340
This date [1340] can be considered as the time when the exploring process originated, the moment when Europe's need to explore the West was born. For the best agreement between curve and data, the early-missing-data parameter has to take a value around fifteen (15).
pp.50-51
The conclusion is that there must have been about fifteen (15) attempts before Columbus that failed while trying to explore the West, the first one dating back to around 1340.
p.51
This kind of backcasting ── if somewhat daring ── is not different from the usual forecasting approach. We are dealing with a pattern similar to that of the growing vocabulary of an infant if we only look at the data pattern upside down and let time run backward. The uncertainties on the number fifteen (15) can be estimated (see Appendix B) to be plus or minus three.
(Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future / Theodore Modis., 1. forecasting., 2. creation (literary, artistic, etc.)., 3. science and civilization., CB 158.M63, 303.49--dc20, 1992, )
____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
pp.471─472
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Theories of rational choice under uncertainty: the contributions of von Neumann and Morgenstern.” Senior honors thesis, Harvard university, 1952.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Classic and current notions of ‘measurable utility’”. Economic journal 64:255 (September 1954), 528─56.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Theory of the reluctant duelist”. American economic review 45:5 (December 1956), 910─23.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “The theory and practice of blackmail”. In Bargaining : formal theories of negotiation, ed. Oran R. Young. Urbana: university of illinois press, 1959, 1971.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “The crude analysis of strategic choice”. American economic review 6:2 (May 1961), 472─78.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms”. Quarterly journal of economics 75:4 (november 1961), 643─69.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Vietnam diary──notes from the journal of a young American in Saigon.” Reporter (January 13, 1966).
Ellsberg, Daniel. “”
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Laos : what NIxon is up to.” New york review of books (March 11, 1971). Reprint in Ellsberg, Papers on the war, 259─74.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “The quagmire myth and the stalemate machine.” Public policy (spring 1971). revised version in Ellsberg, Papers on the wars, 42─135.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Interview by Walter Cronkite. CBS news special report, June 23, 1971. For transcript, see: www.ellsberg.net.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Papers on the war. New york: simon and schuster, 1972.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Risk, ambiguity and decision. New york: Garland, 2001. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard university, 1962.
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
pp.237─239
“Henry, there's something I would like to tell you, for what it's worth, something I wish I had been told years ago. You've been a consultant for a long time, and you've dealt a great deal with top secret information. But you're about to receive a whole slew of special clearances, maybe 15 or 20 of them, and I've known other people who have just acquired them, and I have a pretty good sense of what the effects of receiving these clearances are on a person who didn't previously know they even existed. And the effects of reading the information that they will make available to you.
“First, you'll be exhilarated by some of this new information, and by having it all ── so much! incredible! ── suddenly available to you. But second, almost as fast, you will feel like a fool for having studied, written, talked about these subjects, criticized and analyzed decisions made by the presidents for years without having known of the existence of all this information, which presidents and others had and you didn't, and which must have influenced their decisions in ways you couldn't even guess. In particular, you'll feel foolish for having literally rubbed shoulders for over a decade with some officials and consultants who did have access to all this information you didn't know about and didn't know they had, and you'll be stunned that they kept that secret from you so well.
“You will feel like a fool, and that will last for about two weeks. Then, after you've started reading all this daily intelligence input and become used to using what amounts to whole libraries of hidden information, which is much more closely held than mere top secret data, you will forget there ever was a time when you didn't have it, and you'll be aware only of the fact that you have it now and most others don't ... and all those other people are fools.
“Over a longer period of time ── not too long, but a matter of two or three years ── you'll eventually become aware of the limitations of this information. THere is a great deal that it doesn't tell you, it's often inaccurate, and it can lead you astray just as much as the New York Times can. But that take a while to learn.
“In the meantime it will have become very hard for you to learn from anybody who doesn't have these clearances. Because you'll be thinking as you listen to them: ‘What would this man be telling me if he knew what I know? Would he be giving me the same advice, or would it totally change his predictions and recommendations’ And that mental exercise is so torturous that after a while you give it up and just stop listening. I've seen this with my superiors, my colleagues ... and with myself.
“You will deal with a person who doesn't have those clearances only from the point of view of what you want him to believe and what impression you want him to go away with, since you'll have to lie carefully to him about what you know. In effect, you will have to manipulate him. You'll give up trying to access what he has to say. The danger is, you'll become something like a moron. You'll become incapable of learning from most people in the world, no matter how much experience they may have in their particular areas that may be much greater than yours.”
It was a speech I had thought through before, one I'd wished someone had once given me, and I'd long hoped to be able to give it to someone who was just about to enter the world of “real” executive secrecy. I ended by saying that I'd long thought of this kind of secret information as something like the potion Circe gave to the wanderers and shipwrecked men who happened on her island,
THey became incapable of human speech and couldn't help one another to find their way home.
Kissinger hadn't interrupted this long warning. As I've said, he could be a good listener, and he listened soberly. He seemed to understand that it was heartfelt, and he didn't take it as patronizing, as I'd feared. But I knew that it was too soon for him to appreciate fully what I was saying. He didn't have the clearances yet.
─‘’“”
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
p.43
It is a common place that “you can't keep secrets in Washington” or “in a democracy”, that “no matter how sensitive the secret, you're likely to read it the next day in the New York Times”. These truisms are flatly false. They are in fact cover stories, ways of flattering and misleading journalists and their readers, part of the process of keep secrets well. Of course eventually many secrets do get out that wouldn't in a fully totalitarian society. Bureaucratic rivalries, especially over budget shares, lead to leaks. Moreover, to a certain extent the ability to keep secret for a given amount of time diminishes with the number of people who know it. As secret keepers like to say, “Three people can keep a secret if two of them are dead.” But the fact is that the overwhelming majority of secrets do not leak to the American public.
This is true even when the information withheld is well known to an enemy and when it is clearly essential to the functioning of the congressional war power and to any democratic control of foreign policy. The reality unknown to the public and to most members of congress and the press is that secrets that would be of the greatest import to many of them can be kept from them reliably for decades by the executive branch, even though they are known to thousands of insiders. (see chapter 3.)
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
p.39
NoDis, referring to an office or offices specified, corresponded to eyes only for an individual or a set of individuals, supposed to be seen “only by the eyes of” the addressees named. The point was to control and direct who knew ── and shouldn't know ── in an elaborate hierarchy of responsibility and secrecy.
I was never a person named in the list of addressees of an eyes only message, nor, for that matter, was John McNaughton usually on the list. When I saw that stamp or heading, I was looking at a copy of a document that in principle, according to the designator, wasn't supposed to be copied at all, or to be seen by me or my boss. Nor was International Security Affairs or its assistant secretary (let alone his special assistant) very often among the addressess of a NoDis State dispatch. Usually no one in the Pentagon, even the secretary, was listed for receiving one of these relatively infrequent messages, which tended to be addressed to the secretary of state or the president. But there it was, in front of me, from the message center. Obviously, NoDis and eyes only were, in practice, relative terms, intended (one had to assume that the senders knew this, from their own experience) to cut the number of people who saw a particular secret or top secret message from thousands or hundreds down to scores or even dozens (apart from secretaries or couriers or special assistants).
To get below even that, senders sometimes put rather desperate warnings in the heading, in capitals, “Literally eyes only of the secretary” or “the President”. I was aware of this of course because I was reading it, and I hadn't stolen it, nor had I made the copy that I was reading.
pp.39─40
I gave him the cable number and mentioned that it was from a new series of weekly reports the ambassador was sending personally. It had a special slug, or code word, to designate the series, limiting the distribution, presumably very severely. But I was getting my own copy, as was McNaughton. I told Forrestal these were very interesting, and he should make sure he got on the list.
p.40
(The only sense I could make subsequently of the sensitivity on this was that the code word list must have been devised at Ambassador Maxwell Taylor's request ── for some personal reason that I never learned ── to allow him to communicate to his two bosses in private, specifically keeping the information from his former White House colleague Forrestal.)
p.40
Meanwhile he paid a continuing price for my error. This particular set of messages was no longer sent to his office. Only one copy of these came to the Pentagon, to Secretary McNamara's office. McNaughton had to go there to read the copies, on a clipboard from which he couldn't remove them.
That's how you learn.
pp.79─81
McNaughton kept next to his desk a bookstand with a row of his most frequently referred to and most sensitive directives, cables, estimates, and memoranda compiled into separate binders and three-ring notebooks. It was on rollers, so that when he left late each evening it could be easily moved from his desk into the closet-size, floor-to-ceiling safe that lined the outer wall of his room, along with the library shelves of classified documents stored there. Each morning before he arrived, his military aide unlocked the safe, which had a top secret combination lock, and wheeled his stand of personal reading materials over to his desk, so that he could reach a reference file easily from his chair.
I had access to the materials on this shelf, as I did to anything in the piles of paper on John's desk. But since he wanted instant access to these when he was at his desk, I rarely, if ever, took one of these binders out of his office into my cubbyhole a few steps away. I had copies of most of these same materials in my own safe. But if I needed to refer to something on his personal shelf, I would walk into his office ── if he didn't have a red light showing in the row of lights above his door ── pull it out, and look at it, standing next to his desk, while he worked away. His power of concentration was such that this didn't bother him, if it was carried out quietly and without my saying anything to him. Even so, I generally did that when he wasn't in the office. Since I often worked later than he did, I had the combination to his closet safe, so I could wheel the stand back into it when I was ready to leave the office. As far as I knew, the only others who had that combination, apart from John, were his military aides.
One day in the late spring his chief military aide abruptly left the office. I never heard an explanation for his apparent firing, but the first sign was that his assistant, the junior military aide, gave me a new combination to McNaughton's office safe. It had been changed that morning, the day of the colonel's departure. Sometime before that, though I hadn't made any connection at the time, John had pointed out to me a large binder at the lefthand end of his personal shelf that he asked me not to look in. The label on it was something to the effect of “Vietnam, McNaughton eyes only”. I could use anything else on the stand or in his files, but these were really for his eyes only. He told me it held papers that he had been directed not to share with anyone else at all, and in this case that included me.
p.81
For a number of such nights, I didn't think of looking into the binder that was out of bounds. But John was asking me not to look at high-level policy papers, on Vietnam, in 1965, never to try to find out what was really going on among the “principals”, what they were considering and proposing, what they were writing to one another, even when, it seemed, I could do so without anyone's knowing.
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
Theodore Modis., Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future, 1992.
pp.37-38
p.37
Critics of S-curves have always raised the question of uncertainties as the most serious argument against forecasts of this kind.
p.37
Obviously the more good-quality measurements available, the more reliable the determination of the final ceiling. But I would not dismiss the method for fear of making a mistake.
p.37
Alain Debecker and I carried out a systematic study of the uncertainties to be expected as a function of the number of data points, their measurement errors, and how much of the S-curve they cover.
p.37
We did this in the physics tradition through a computer program simulating “historical” data along S-curves smeared with random deviations, and covering a variety of conditions. The subsequent fits aimed to recover the original S-curve.
p.37
We left the computer running over the weekend.
pp.37-38
On Monday morning we had piles of printout containing over forty thousand fits.
p.38
The results were published,12 and a summary of them is given in Appendix B, but the rule of thumb is as follows:
If the measurements cover about half of the life cycle of the growth process in question and the error per point is not bigger than 10 percent, nine times out of ten the final niche capacity will turn out to be less than 20 percent away from the forecasted one.
p.38
The results of our study were both demystifying and reassuring. The predictive power of S-curves is neither magical nor worthless.
p.50
1340
This date [1340] can be considered as the time when the exploring process originated, the moment when Europe's need to explore the West was born. For the best agreement between curve and data, the early-missing-data parameter has to take a value around fifteen (15).
pp.50-51
The conclusion is that there must have been about fifteen (15) attempts before Columbus that failed while trying to explore the West, the first one dating back to around 1340.
p.51
This kind of backcasting ── if somewhat daring ── is not different from the usual forecasting approach. We are dealing with a pattern similar to that of the growing vocabulary of an infant if we only look at the data pattern upside down and let time run backward. The uncertainties on the number fifteen (15) can be estimated (see Appendix B) to be plus or minus three.
(Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future / Theodore Modis., 1. forecasting., 2. creation (literary, artistic, etc.)., 3. science and civilization., CB 158.M63, 303.49--dc20, 1992, )
____________________________________
Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers, 2002
pp.471─472
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Theories of rational choice under uncertainty: the contributions of von Neumann and Morgenstern.” Senior honors thesis, Harvard university, 1952.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Classic and current notions of ‘measurable utility’”. Economic journal 64:255 (September 1954), 528─56.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Theory of the reluctant duelist”. American economic review 45:5 (December 1956), 910─23.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “The theory and practice of blackmail”. In Bargaining : formal theories of negotiation, ed. Oran R. Young. Urbana: university of illinois press, 1959, 1971.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “The crude analysis of strategic choice”. American economic review 6:2 (May 1961), 472─78.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms”. Quarterly journal of economics 75:4 (november 1961), 643─69.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Vietnam diary──notes from the journal of a young American in Saigon.” Reporter (January 13, 1966).
Ellsberg, Daniel. “”
Ellsberg, Daniel. “Laos : what NIxon is up to.” New york review of books (March 11, 1971). Reprint in Ellsberg, Papers on the war, 259─74.
Ellsberg, Daniel. “The quagmire myth and the stalemate machine.” Public policy (spring 1971). revised version in Ellsberg, Papers on the wars, 42─135.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Interview by Walter Cronkite. CBS news special report, June 23, 1971. For transcript, see: www.ellsberg.net.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Papers on the war. New york: simon and schuster, 1972.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Risk, ambiguity and decision. New york: Garland, 2001. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard university, 1962.
(Secrets : a memoir of vietnam and the pentagon papers / daniel ellsberg., 1. vietnamese conflict, 1961─1975──unitd states., 2. pentagon papers., 3. ellsberg, daniel., DS558 .E44 2002, 959.704'3373──dc21, 2002, )
____________________________________
No comments:
Post a Comment