battle of mogadishu (1993)
Gothic Serpent : Black Hawk Down, Mogadishu 1993
Author:Clayton K. S. Chun
Summary:"Containing detailed analysis and declassified information, this is the true story of the battle made famous by the film Black Hawk down and its far-reaching impact on US military policy"--Page 4 of cover
https://www.worldcat.org/title/798085124
Losing Mogadishu : testing U.S. policy in Somalia
Author:Jonathan Stevenson
Publisher:Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md., ©1995
http://worldcat.org/oclc/31435791
In 1999, writer Mark Bowden published the book Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, which chronicles the events that surrounded the battle. The book was based on his series of columns for The Philadelphia Inquirer about the battle and the men who fought.[160]
Film
Bowden's book has been adapted into the film Black Hawk Down (2001), produced by Jerry Bruckheimer and directed by Ridley Scott. Like the book, the film describes events surrounding the operation, but there are differences between the book and the film, such as Rangers marking targets at night by throwing strobe lights at them, when in reality the Rangers marked their own positions and close air support targeted everything else.[165]
Malaysian film Malbatt: Misi Bakara, directed by Adrian Teh, retells the story of Malaysian contingent of UNOSOM II involvement during the rescue operation in the battle.[166]
https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Airmen-at-War/Marion-SpecialTacticsMogadishu1993.pdf
https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Airmen-at-War/Marion-SpecialTacticsMogadishu1993.pdf?ver=2016-08-22-131410-290
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2022/February/Battle-of-Mogadishu/
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[[ extensive bibliography, references and sources ]]
[[ pdf file, 74 pages, text can be highlite, not pdf image ]]
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Sangvic, R. N. (1998)). Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a failure.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA366316.pdf
Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure
A Monograph by Major Roger N. Sangvic
Military Intelligence
School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
First Term AY 98-99
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA366316.pdf
ABSTRACT
BATTLE OF MOGADISHU: ANATOMY OF A FAILURE by MAJ Roger N. Sangvic,
USA, 48 pages.
By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper has shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as luke warm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.
While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR
could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR's capabilities and underestimation of the enemy's ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TFR conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters. Third, TF planners failed to utilize all their available resources and integrate these resources into a plan that could be flexible enough to handle the threat and all the friction in this risky operation.
This paper demonstrates that TF Ranger's 3 October mission failed as a result of the organization, not the decisions of Secretary Aspin alone. As Cohen and Gooch observed, military misfortune is not merely the result of an individual mistake, but rather, the result of series of mistakes throughout a system. Ultimately, TFR and the system it was working in failed to anticipate and adapt.
https://www.thoughtco.com/battle-of-mogadishu-4153921
On October 3, 1993, a special operations unit of U.S. Army Ranger and Delta Force troops headed for the center of Mogadishu, Somalia to capture three rebel leaders. The mission was thought to be relatively straightforward, but when two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters were shot down, the mission took a disastrous turn for the worse. By the time the sun set over Somalia the next day, a total of 18 Americans had been killed and another 73 wounded. U.S. helicopter pilot Michael Durant had been taken prisoner, and hundreds of Somali civilians had died in what would become known as the Battle of Mogadishu.
Battle of Mogadishu: A Mission Gone Bad
On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger, composed of elite U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy special operations troops, launched a mission intended to capture warlord Mohamed Far Aidid and two top leaders of his Habr Gidr clan. Task Force Ranger consisted of 160 men, 19 aircraft, and 12 vehicles. In a mission planned to take no longer than one hour, Task Force Ranger was to travel from its camp on the outskirts of the city to a burned-out building near the center of Mogadishu where Aidid and his lieutenants were believed to be meeting.
While the operation initially succeeded, the situation quickly spiraled out of control as Task Force Range attempted to return to headquarters. Within minutes, the “one-hour” mission would turn into a deadly overnight rescue campaign that became the Battle of Mogadishu.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/script.html
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